As Henri Serruys demonstrated decades ago, from 1368 to 1449 tens of thousands of Mongols joined the fledgling Ming dynasty. Although the number of Mongols relocating to China declined markedly from the mid–fifteenth century onward, more than 150 years after the last of the major Mongol emigrations to China, these Mongols (daguan dajun as they were often termed) appear in a wide variety of Ming documents. Why?

For students of the steppe, particularly Mongolists, Mongols in Ming China form an important part of post–imperial history. A clearer understanding of their fate will make possible a more integrative study of Mongolian personnel in sedentary empires elsewhere in Eurasia during the early modern period. For those interested in the transition between the Yuan and the Ming dynasties, Ming Mongols offer a point of departure in our efforts to understand continuity, change, and synthesis between the Mongols’ vast, complex polity and the last native dynasty in Chinese history. For military historians, the Ming Mongols offer insight into the use of foreign military personnel within China.

1 I would like to thank William Atwell, Johan Elverskog, Elizabeth Endicott–West, Peter Golden, Martin Heijdra, Ellen McGill, Frederick Mote, Andrew Rotter, Kira Stevens, members of the Colgate History Department reading group and the Seminar on Traditional China at Columbia University for commenting on earlier versions of this paper. The readers for Late Imperial China also shared generously their wide learning and insight. I regret only that I have been unable to respond effectively to all of their valuable suggestions. Finally, I would also like to express gratitude for the financial support of Colgate University’s Research Council that made possible the completion of this essay.

2 I treat the term daguan as an abbreviation of Dada junguan (Tatar officers) and dajun as an abbreviation of Dada guanjun (Tartar imperial troops). Dada or Tatar generally referred to Mongols, but also included Jurchens.

Although all these issues deserve further exploration, this preliminary study examines the relation between Chinese administrative systems and images of subject Mongols. The studies of Pamela Crossley, Mark Elliott, Joanna Waley–Cohen, Evelyn Rawski, and others have contributed to a sophisticated appreciation of the wide variety of factors at work in the construction and maintenance of Manchu identity during the Qing dynasty (1636–1911). Important too has been work related to questions of the identification and classification of various subjugated groups in the context of Qing empire and colonialism.

Less studied have been perceptions and descriptions of non–Chinese groups within the Ming empire (1368–1644). This situation is as understandable as it is regrettable. Qing historians today have at their disposal a far more voluminous and detailed documentary and pictorial record. Not only have many more materials survived from the Qing than from the Ming, but the former was a self–consciously expansionistic and colonialist power. The Qing government was keenly interested in categorizing and describing its newly acquired lands and peoples. Perhaps most fundamentally, as a foreign conquest dynasty, the Qing was intensely occupied with the question of identity throughout the life of the dynasty.

The question of subject populations, their place in administrative apparati, their relations with other groups within China and beyond, and finally the images generated through these various interaction are, however, critical for understanding the Ming dynasty. The Ming, like nearly all regimes that controlled the Central Plains, was a multi–ethnic empire that incorporated Chinese, Korean, Mongolian, Jurchen, Khitan, Parhae, Vietnamese, Zhuang, Li,

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6 Edward Rhoads, *Manchus and Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power In Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861–1928* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000). The question of imperial identity during the Ming has been less thoroughly examined than during the Qing period. For a recent reexamination of Ming imperial identity in light of the Yuan legacy, see Robinson, “Ming Imperial Family and the Mongol Legacy,” Conference on Ming Court Culture, Princeton, Princeton University, June 12, 2003.
and a wide variety of other peoples. Studies of various groups in the southwest corner of the Ming have examined the interplay between Chinese imperial administrative structures and indigenous groups. These works demonstrate that the creation of discrete ethnic or tribal names and identities was often tied to the bureaucratic imperatives of the Ming state. Frederick Wakeman’s classic description of the transfrontiermen of the northeastern corner of the Chinese empire during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries sheds light on the fluid nature of ethnic identification and shifting relations with the Ming state.

The present essay adds to our understanding of subject populations through an examination of perceptions of Mongol personnel in the Capital Region during the Ming dynasty. In particular, I focus on how these images were developed and how they were transmitted within China. As demonstrated below, perceptions of Mongolian communities in the Capital Region varied widely according to time, place, and context. Their meaning was never self-evident.

My central argument is that administrative concerns of the Ming state often powerfully shaped images of Ming Mongols. The state was generally more interested in how Mongols fit into pre–existing bureaucratic operations such as household registration categories, tax and labor service obligations, and jurisdictional responsibilities between military and civil authorities than in what we more commonly consider ethnic features like language, clothing, lifeways, or notions of descent. A second and related element of my argument is that Ming Mongols became inseparably linked to imperial military institutions. This was not only because Mongols served as commanders and soldiers in Ming imperial armies, but because the Mongols were generally registered...
in hereditary military households, a bureaucratic category that identified the Mongols’ place within the dynastic administrative system. Finally, during the latter half of the Ming dynasty, certain descriptions of Mongols circulated widely through the market forces of a vigorous publishing industry. To the unsuspecting observer, they might appear largely as ethnic descriptions that highlight alien customs and the Mongols’ barbaric nature. These images, however, often sprang initially from administrators’ pens and reflected their concerns.

Thus, this essay examines the interplay among the imperatives of the Ming bureaucracy, military institutions, and China’s vibrant print culture of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. At the risk of stating the obvious, my documentary base dictates that this be a decidedly Sinocentric approach to the Mongols’ place in China. Although I touch upon how Mongols may have viewed themselves, their relations to the Ming state, and their relations to Mongols on the steppe, this article’s focus is squarely on the Chinese state’s perceptions of subject Mongols in the Capital Region and the transmission of those images within Ming society.

Mongols in China during the Yuan–Ming Transition

The Great Mongol empire of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries transformed Eurasia. The Mongols influenced everything from trade, bureaucratic administration, and ethnic displacement to linguistic borrowings, microbial transmission, and the tone of politics and culture. Less thoroughly explored is the impact of the Mongol empire and its collapse on the Mongols themselves.

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12 For recent studies on the flow of people, goods, technologies, and tastes across Eurasia under the Mongols, see Thomas Allsen, Commodity and Exchange in the Mongol Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) and scholarship cited therein.

The majority of Mongols vacated the Central Plains following the Mongol Yuan dynasty’s collapse in 1368. Although the so-called Northern Yuan remained an imminent political and military threat to northern China for only a few decades, the now divided Mongols posed the Ming court’s primary military challenge until late in the dynasty. Despite this hostility, steppe Mongols migrated to Ming China in significant numbers during the first third of the dynasty. Several considerations drove them. Many wished to escape “the poverty, the misery, the maladministration and civil wars of the post–Yuan years in Mongolia,” when the region “was in a state of utmost disorder.” Others, particularly portions of the Mongol elite, had grown accustomed to sedentary and often urban life in China. Unable to adjust to the sudden return to the rigors of the steppe, some saw service with the Ming as an attractive alternative.

Commonly serving in Ming imperial garrisons and the emperors’ personal bodyguard, the Mongols received hereditary titles, grants of land, housing, livestock, gifts of textiles, and other imperial favors. The Mongols were widely scattered throughout China, with especially large numbers resettled along the northwestern border, the new dynastic capital of Nanjing, and around...
the former Yuan capital of Dadu, now known as Beiping. The Ming imperial court incorporated most of these “Ming Mongols” into the hereditary military household system. Large contingents of these Mongolian officers and soldiers were stationed in garrisons throughout the Northern Metropolitan Area. Others facilitated Ming diplomatic ties with Mongols on the steppe, compiling for instance the famous Sino–Mongolian bilingual text *Huayi yiyu.*

What happened to Mongol communities in China under the Ming dynasty? Henry Serruys’ pioneering work takes the story up through the first century of Ming rule. At the risk of oversimplification, Serruys argued that through the opening decades of the fifteenth century Mongols in China proper retained much of their culture, including such critical markers as dress, hairstyles, language, and attention to military skills. He suggested that over time, presumably in the sixteenth century, these Mongols thoroughly assimilated Chinese ways, at least in the hinterlands. Discussing prominent Mongols of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries who joined the Ming, Serruys observed, “it is very questionable whether their descendants can still be called Mongols.” Materials not available to Serruys half a century ago, however, demonstrate that the Ming state continued to distinguish the Mongols from the rest of the Chinese population until the end of the dynasty.

*Mongols in North China and the Yuan–Ming Transition*

Given the considerable differences that separated the Capital Region from the Mongolian steppe—ecological, political, cultural, social, and military—one might reasonably conclude that Mongolian lifeways in China were quickly reshaped under Ming rule. One would like to know the effects of several factors: the initial uprooting and move to China, the long–term interaction between Mongol communities and local society in the Capital Region, and, per-

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21 Cao Shuji suggests that nearly 300,000 of the 360,000 people registered as civilian households in the 1393 records for Beiping Prefecture were either Mongols or their descendents. See Cao Shuji, *Zhongguorenkou shi,* volume 4, *Ming shiqi* (Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 2000), p. 257.


23 For a brief note on the *Huayi yiyu* and one of its Mongolian compilers, Qoninci, see Roy Andrew Miller’s entry in the *Dictionary of Ming Biography,* pp. 1125–27.

haps most importantly, the administrative and organizational demands required of Mongol communities to deal with Ming bureaucratic structures and imperatives. These demands included permanent registration in governmental household categories, rendering taxes, corvée, and military services, the acceptance of Ming law codes and punishments, and the possibility of forced relocation.

That being said, there was some continuity in the lifestyle of Mongols in North China during the late Yuan and early Ming. From the late thirteenth century, throughout much of Eurasia, Mongols, particularly the elite, spent much of their time in cities. Mongol rulers among the Ilkhanate of Persia, the Yuan dynasty in China, and to a lesser degree the Golden Horde in Russia, seem to have developed a more sedentary life than had obtained prior to the formation of the empire.25 Although the Yuan court spent approximately two months of each year on the road traveling the nearly 300 miles between the two capitals of the Yuan empire, Dadu (Beijing) and Shangdu, the rest of the year the court resided in these two urban areas.26 Dadu and Shangdu were far from spartan military outposts. They boasted towering walls, lavish palaces, exquisitely appointed living quarters, entertainment quarters, and a full panoply of services—from chefs, courtesans, doctors, and silver artisans to leather workers, carpenters, professional scholars, artists, and religious specialists.27 The capitals were also the sites of the week-long “Colors Banquets,” which featured sumptuous foods, fine serving vessels, munificent gifts to guests, and abundant quantities of alcohol.28

Dadu was an international center of culture, religion, and learning. It drew Confucian scholars, Buddhist monks, Islamic clerics, and others from Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Tibet, the Middle East, and Western Europe, not to mention


26 Chen Gaohua and Shi Weimin, *Yuan Shangdu* (Jilin: Jilin jiaoyu chubanshe, 1988), 33, 58–60. For a description of the imperial entourages and the routes they traveled, see Chen and Shi, pp. 26–74.

27 For evocations of the Mongol capitals during the Yuan, see Ye Xinmin, *Yuan Shangdu yanjiu* (Huhehaote: Neimenggu daxue chubanshe, 1998); Shi Weimin, *Dushizhong de youmumin* (Changsha: Hunan chubanshe, 1996); Chen Gaohua, *Yuan Dadu* (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1982).

those who traveled from various provinces within China proper. Tales of the legendary wealth and opulence of the Mongol capitals, spread by such accounts as Marco Polo’s *Travels*, inflamed West European imaginations for generations. One need not agree that by early in the fourteenth century “the conquerors were now largely Confucian adherents themselves”29 to grant that the Mongol empire had deeply influenced many Mongols’ lifestyles and expectations. It is understandable, then, that some Mongols of the late Yuan were reluctant to turn their backs permanently on the comforts of North China. Upon his return to the steppe, the last Yuan emperor Toghon Temür reportedly lamented, ”My Dadu, you simple but perfect home decorated with all kinds of precious stones! You fresh and beautiful Shangdu, sited in yellow steppe, summer residence of former Khans.”30

If the steppe was a particularly demanding environment during the late fourteenth century, the early Ming North China plain to which the Mongols returned only palely reflected the glories of the high Yuan. The devolution of political power that characterized much of the mid–fourteenth century went hand–in–hand with violence, epidemics, economic collapse, droughts, and floods, devastating much of North China. Agricultural lands fell out of cultivation as hundreds of thousands of inhabitants died or fled. North China’s agricultural base sustained lasting damage. Thus when, in 1368, the military commander Xu Da (1332–1385) and his Ming armies drove the last Yuan emperor and his court from Dadu, marking the initial subjugation of North China, they took control of a land much diminished—glorious imperial palaces lay in ruins, highways and postal routes damaged and understaffed, the population much reduced, and families scattered. Although debates swirled about the number and locations of potential new Ming dynastic capitals, few considered Dadu.31 Dadu was now merely Beiping and, deprived of its former political centrality, it faded.

As a result of the tumultuous Yuan–Ming transition, during the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries the Northern Metropolitan Area still contained a relative abundance of uncultivated lands and open spaces. The early Ming emperors devoted wide swaths of land in North China to imperial pasturages, where horses grazed and bred. These horses were to supply the Ming cavalry, and (from the early fifteenth century) especially those forces concen-

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29 Dardess, *Conquerors and Confucians*, p. 2.
Images of Subject Mongols Under the Ming Dynasty

trated around the capital in Beijing. A considerable bureaucratic apparatus, the eunuch–staffed Directorate of Imperial Horses, managed these lands, fodder, granaries, horses, and breeders. At its height during the early sixteenth century, the Directorate of Imperial Horses oversaw a reported 56 pasture lands and twenty stables, encompassing 336,000 acres of land, the overwhelming majority concentrated in the Capital Region.32

Thus the unusual importance of city life for Mongol elites during the late Yuan and the greater availability of lands for pasture brought about by the depressed conditions of North China during the early Ming created continuity for many other less exalted Mongols residing in and around Beijing. One should also note that, during the Yuan, common Mongol households in North China frequently lived interspersed among Chinese neighbors, held agricultural lands, and often intermarried with Chinese families.33 In the process, they developed a degree of familiarity with Chinese social practices that facilitated their transition from the Yuan to the Ming.

How Mongols Served the Ming

The Ming court cultivated the Mongols for a variety of reasons. Gaining and maintaining the allegiance of at least a portion of steppe leaders was an important element of the Ming government’s strategy for keeping the Mongols disunified. Furthermore, the support of some Mongol tribal leaders bolstered the legitimacy of the dynasty in the eyes of Inner Asian peoples—first following Zhu Yuanzhang’s initial establishment of the dynasty and later after his son, Zhu Di (1360–1424, r. 1402–1424), usurped power from his nephew early in the fifteenth century. As generous patrons well positioned to reward allies, early Ming emperors gained a measure of credibility and respect in Inner Asia during these two key transitional periods in the dynasty.

The court valued the Mongols’ military prowess and reliability. In dozens of cases, units of Mongols participated in dynastic campaigns of suppression against domestic challengers throughout the length and breadth of the empire. Over the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Ming Mongol troops campaigned from the Northern Metropolitan Area, Henan, Shanxi, and Shandong to the Southern Metropolitan Area, Huguang, Fujian, Jiangxi, and Guangdong.34 Mongol troops were even deployed against Chinese soldiers
run amok. When imperial troops in the strategically critical Datong garrisons mutinied in 1524, three thousand Mongols from Baoding were among those mobilized to protect critical passes in North China in an effort to contain the revolt.35 Ming Mongols also appear repeatedly in the defense of Beijing against hostile Mongols—during Esen’s 1449 raids in the suburbs of the capital, during the aborted coup of 1461 in which high-ranking Mongol military officers appeared on both sides,36 and finally during Altan Khan’s 1550 raid on Beijing.37

A comparison of descriptions of Ming Mongols in the capital’s defense in 1449 and 1550 suggests that by the mid-sixteenth century Mongols in the Ming army had improved their reputation for loyalty and dependability, at least among senior officials of the day. Whereas in 1449 officials repeatedly accused Ming Mongols of pillaging and disloyalty during a moment of dynastic crisis, in 1550 we read only of Ming Mongols’ part in the defense of the realm. Reports did reach the court that bandits had capitalized upon the chaos resulting from Altan Khan’s raids to pillage in the environs of Beijing. In contrast to 1449, however, the Mongols escaped any such criminal/treasonous accusations.38 Late in 1560s, thousands of Mongol soldiers stationed in Baoding, Hejian, and Dingzhou were deployed to such north border garrisons as Jizhou and Juyong Pass to stiffen defenses against steppe Mongols.39

The Ming Mongols’ cavalry skills were particularly attractive to the Chinese court. How long and well the Mongols maintained their renowned cavalry skills, however, is unclear. One suspects that during the fifteenth century, as open pasture lands in the Capital Region decreased and lifestyles changed, attaining such expertise grew more difficult. In its efforts to raise horses in the region, during the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the court also made periodic use of Mongols as advisors to local Chinese.40 Throughout the fif-

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36 See Robinson, “Politics, Force, and Ethnicity in Ming China.”

37 For details of the Mongols’ participation in the Ming’s defenses against Altan Khan, see SZSL, 357.2, 360.3a, 362.2a, 364.2b, 366.1a, 367.1a, 367.4a–b, 6a, 14a. For additional instances of Mongol loyalty to the Ming in the northwest, see Serruys, “The Mongols of Kansu during the Ming,” pp. 334–336.

38 Shizong shilu, 364.14a.


40 Serruys, “The Mongols in China: 1400–1450,” pp. 296–97. He refers to a 1412 report in which “‘unemployed Tatar officers were selected to teach the people how to raise horses’” in the Northern Metropolitan Area.
Images of Subject Mongols Under the Ming Dynasty

tenenth and sixteenth centuries, Mongol cavalry contingents repeatedly fought in campaigns within the Ming empire.\textsuperscript{41} As late as the 1540s, the court mobilized Ming Mongols against steppe Mongols along the northern border. The court supplied them with as many as several thousand horses from the Court of the Imperial Stud on numerous occasions.\textsuperscript{42} Such incidents suggest that, while the Mongols probably no longer raised their own mounts, they were still known for their cavalry skills.\textsuperscript{43}

The linguistic skills and cultural knowledge of Mongols proved useful to the Ming court in its relations with neighboring countries. As noted above, one of the chief compilers of the late fourteenth-century Sino–Mongolian bilingual text, the \textit{Huayi yiyu}, was a Mongol. Scattered evidence suggests continuing linguistic competence in the Mongolian language well into the fifteenth century. For instance, in 1440 a Mongol officer in the Anterior Yulin Garrison was pardoned, recalled from punitive exile in Guangxi, and appointed to teach “written Tatar” (\textit{dada wenshu}) in the Translator’s Institute (Siyiguan).\textsuperscript{44} During his year–long captivity by the Oirat Mongol leader Esen following the disastrous Tumu Incident of 1449, the emperor Yingzong relied on the interpreting and negotiating skills of surviving Ming Mongols from his entourage.\textsuperscript{45} Although sharply criticized by contemporary officials, the emperor Wuzong (r. 1506–1521) actively recruited Mongols and other Inner Asians into his personal bodyguard. Part of his goal was gathering personnel with the requisite cultural and linguistic knowledge to establish a more active diplomatic posture vis–à–vis Inner and Central Asia powers.\textsuperscript{46} Evidence of Wuzong’s

\textsuperscript{41} For examples, see Robinson, “Politics, Force and Ethnicity”; \textit{Bandits, Eunuchs, and the Son of Heaven. Shizong shilu}, 311.5b; 348.1b.

\textsuperscript{42} Mongols settled in the northwest began to receive mounts from the imperial government no later than the mid–fifteenth century. See Serruys, “Mongols in Kansu during the Ming.” p. 338. For an example from 1518 when Ming Mongols were supplied with horses and travel grain for a mobilization against steppe Mongols along the northern border, see Liang Chu, “Yi bianwu shu,” \textit{Yuzhou yigao} (photolithic reproduction of 1566 edition held in Sonkeikaku Collection), 2.27a–b.

\textsuperscript{43} YZSL, 64.9b, vol. 24, p. 1232. A 1434 entry of the Zhengde edition of the Collected Statutes of the Ming indicates that there were also Mongol and Muslim students in the Siyiguan who received generous stipends. See Zhengde \textit{Da Ming huidian}, 30.6b, “Hubu shiwu fengji er,” vol. 1, p. 330.

\textsuperscript{44} For a biographical note on Yang Ming (original name Ha–ming) by Hok–lam Chan, see \textit{Dictionary of Ming Biography}, pp. 1523–25. Yang penned one of the key records of the emperor’s captivity, the \textit{Zhengtong linronglu}. Writing early in the sixteenth century, the scholar and calligrapher Zhu Yunneng (1461–1527) recounted with admiration the loyalty and resourcefulness of a certain “Desert Fox,” a Ming Mongol who served as Yingzong’s interpreter and attendant during his time in the steppe. See Zhu Yunneng, \textit{Ye ji} (two), reprinted in Deng Shilong, \textit{Guochao diangu} (mid–sixteenth century; reprinted Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1993), vol. 1, p. 543.

interest in Inner Asian languages may be seen in his 1521 order to purchase in Gansu sixty Muslim, Mongolian, and Tibetan boys fifteen years or younger who could speak and write Chinese. Upon his death, the edict was rescinded; the Empress Dowager ordered that the boys be returned to their masters.47

Impact of Ming Service on the Mongols

The decision to join the Ming dynasty affected Mongolians in many ways. First, although Ming records often lumped all Mongols who joined the dynasty into the monolithic category “Tatar,” one should not assume any level of tribal cohesion before their arrival in China. As Barfield, Serruys, and Rossabi have shown, shifting alliances and jockeying for position were important and ongoing facets of Mongolian political life.48 Even as efforts to use the Ming grew out of inter–Mongol competition, the decision to join the Chinese often proved momentous, deeply influencing the nature of successful leadership, the cohesiveness of Mongol communities, and the preservation of Mongol clan identity.

One wonders to what degree Inner Asian alliances and rivalries were reproduced within the borders of China. The Ming court determined when and where Mongol communities were to be settled within the empire. These relocations frequently meant that previously unconnected groups of Mongols were stationed in the same garrisons and lived cheek by jowl. One suspects that over time old ties grew tenuous, and new bonds grew in their stead.49

In many cases, the imperial court first settled newly arrived Mongol communities in border regions in China and later relocated them further inland.50 The Ming court commonly confirmed the positions of Mongol leaders, whose tribal authority was now bolstered by official titles within the Ming military. The Chinese court bestowed upon these Mongol leaders command over their relocated communities. In such cases, the move to China seems not to have fundamentally altered Mongol communities, at least initially.

47 See WZSL 197.8b.
49 Writing of developments late in the sixteenth century, Serruys has noted that “the old ideas of Mongol feudal society certainly had already undergone some changes due in part to the closeness of the Chinese territories, the influx of Chinese prisoners and immigrants into Southern Mongolia, and the possibility, always open to Mongols, to move into China when dissatisfied with living conditions in Mongolia.” See Serruys, “A Mongol Settlement in North China,” p. 245.
50 Management of Inner Asian groups who chose to move to China was an ongoing question for successive dynasties. For an excellent discussion of the main policies drawn from the Tang period, see Pan Yihong, “Early Chinese Settlement Policies towards the Nomads,” Asia Major 5.2 (1994): 41–77.
Images of Subject Mongols Under the Ming Dynasty

Community and Leadership

The relationship between initial constructions of allegiance and community and Mongol interaction with Ming administrative structures was complex. This was true even when the Chinese court confirmed the status of Mongol leaders who elected to join the Ming through high-ranking military posts within the Ming military. Lesser followers, the reasoning goes, were granted corresponding rank within the Ming imperial armies, down to the majority of their followers who were made ordinary soldiers. To the degree that this process did occur as outlined above, it would seem to have reconfirmed preexisting social/military status as a Chinese institutional framework reinforced Mongolian organization.

Yet the process was seldom so straightforward. Chinese records may have passed lightly over those Mongol leaders who either never chose to ally themselves with the Ming or who announced their allegiance only to recant later. We may assume that Chinese records show a preference for more cooperative Mongol leaders by emphasizing their positions of authority and natural leadership. This would at one stroke heighten their new Mongol allies’ authority among other Mongols and undermine any potential sources of competing authority or allegiance. It undoubtedly had the added benefit of reassuring Chinese officials that their new clients merited their subsidies.

A related question is the effect of pegging Mongol patterns of organization to the Ming’s more structured administrative system. Here too it is important to consider the impact of the Yuan dynasty upon Mongol social organization, at least in the immediate post-empire years. Patrimonial–style patronage and personal ties of loyalty were clearly vital at the highest levels of Mongol society well into the fourteenth century. Yet one suspects that the institutionalization of social/personal relations among non–elite Mongols from the mid–thirteenth century may have contributed to a depersonalization of those ties. By the fourteenth century, if not earlier, an enormous gap in wealth and living conditions separated Yuan Mongols who had relocated to Dadu and further south from those who remained in the steppe, the majority of whom faced deepening poverty. Even among those Mongols living within China proper, major differences in wealth, political influence, and cultural affinity separated elites from common soldiers.

51 Allsen, *Commodity and Exchange in the Mongol Empire*, pp. 53–57.
52 On Möngke’s effort to increase efficiency and control through greater levels of centralization, see Thomas Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
This trend continued during the Ming when the state singled out certain senior Mongol leaders for special recognition and honors. These Mongol leaders often established their residences in the capital and moved among the circles of Ming high society there. The distance between such exalted members of the empire-wide elite and common Mongol soldiers would seldom have been alleviated by personal contact or sense of mutual obligation.

Even in such cases of evident continuity from Inner Asian days as the link between battle merit and rewards, the dynamic subtly differed. Military prowess was an essential element of gaining and maintaining leadership positions in Mongol society. In Ming China, too, military success often resulted in promotions, titles, and cash rewards. However, when Mongols fought for the Ming state, their victories (like those of their Chinese counterparts) had to be vetted by Chinese censors assigned to evaluate military merit on campaign. Titles and rewards were determined by bureaucratic processes in the capital, and the actual implementation of imperial orders was often dependent on local officials. Thus, a bulky and sometimes unpredictable bureaucratic system inserted itself between military victory and its attendant rewards. Mediated rewards replaced the seizure of booty from battle and raids.

One may speculate that this process too may have changed relations between local Mongol leaders and their followers. A leader had not only to be a successful general, he also needed sufficient political connections to guarantee that battlefield success produced tangible benefits for his followers. This process at once demonstrated the limits of the individual Mongol leader’s power vis-à-vis the imperial state, and the importance of the Mongol leader’s good offices as a political broker. In other circumstances the ties of leadership were less direct, as when Mongols with aristocratic titles and residences in Beijing were made responsible for Mongol military units located a day or more’s ride south of the capital. The illustrious Mongol military family, the Wus, resided in the capital, but was held responsible for Mongol units garrisoned south of Beijing. Similarly distant relations could pertain between elite Mongol officers and the men they commanded in the northwestern corner of the Ming.

The new arrivals were frequently incorporated into more well-established Mongol communities in such areas as Hejian, Baoding, and Dingzhou. Issues of integration, the level and resolution of internal tensions, and the likelihood

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55 For a detailed biography of Batu Temür, who initially led the Wus to China, see Serruys, “Mongols Ennobled During the Early Ming,” HJAS 22 (1959): 215–19. The court granted to Batu Temür and his descendants the Chinese surname Wu, the name under which they most frequently appear in Chinese records. For the Wu family during the mid-fifteenth century and its role in suppressing an abortive coup, see Robinson, “Politics, Force, and Ethnicity in Ming China,” pp. 101–102.

56 Serruys, “The Mongols of Kansu during the Ming.”
of a heightened sense of Mongol identity in a largely Chinese environment remain, however, opaque. Ming records generally do not detail such ongoing social processes. At least a portion of the Chinese officer corps felt that only Mongol officers should oversee Mongol troops. Noting that Chinese did not understand the Mongols, an officer in the Imperial Guard of Nanjing requested in 1457 that the court appoint a prominent Mongol from Beijing who spoke fluent Mongolian to oversee the Nanjing Mongols.57

Mongolian communities’ responses to leaders appointed by Chinese fiat varied. Mongol military personnel could react violently when they felt their interests were endangered. In 1458, “those among the surrendered northern caitiffs who were incensed that the court made them live in Nanjing killed several men from their escort.”58 A year later, the Grand Commandant of Nanjing complained that the Mongol leader charged with maintaining control over the Mongol population in the city was unable to carry effectively out his duties.59 Perhaps the most spectacular Mongol attempt to ensure leadership sympathetic to their interests was an abortive coup in August 1461, when a portion of the Mongol officer corps in Beijing joined their eunuch patron in a brief but bloody uprising in the heart of the capital.60

The specter of overly influential Mongol leaders frightened some Ming officials. Late during the 1450s, the Grand Coordinator of Shandong informed the court that among the many “unruly and wild” Mongols in the province, one man had emerged as a ringleader. Based on this report, the Mongol leader was seized during his next sojourn in Beijing,61 and in 1463 he was again imprisoned briefly for his alleged involvement in the attempted coup d’état of 1461.62

In 1464 a censor in Nanjing echoed such sentiments, suggesting that the court would be wise periodically to separate Mongol leaders from their followers.63 He wrote of the potential danger posed by Mongol units near the capital. The official observed, “Brigands should not be lodged within the gates of a house; leopards and tigers should not repose within a hamlet. In the unlikely event of an emergency, they will await chaos and move into action.” He then proposed that “the leaders who originally supervised them should also

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57 YZSL, 281.8a–b.
58 YZSL, 295.5a. Several of the Mongols were executed and dismembered in a public place by imperial order.
59 YZSL, 303.3b.
60 Robinson, “Politics, Force, and Ethnicity in Ming China.”
62 YZSL, 354.1b–2a.
63 Xianzong shilu, 5.5a–b. The official was Zheng An.
be transferred to separate guard units, so that they shall not congregate in a single place and hatch their schemes. When people are few, they are easily controlled. When their force is dissipated, they are easily weakened. [These measures] will enable China to be at peace and the schemes of the barbarians to be forever checked.”

Despite some Ming officials’ clear worries that Mongol leaders would develop dangerously loyal followers, the court maintained its basic policy of using Mongol officers to oversee Mongol units throughout the remainder of the dynasty. To note just a few examples from the sixteenth century, in 1519 the court assigned an assistant Mongol Regional Military Commissioner to oversee the Mongol officers and officers-in-waiting of Baoding, while in 1523 a Mongol Assistant Commander was placed in charge of these same Baoding Mongol personnel.

Changing Environment

Other pressures contributed to a reworking of Mongol communities. For instance, the transition from nomadic pastoralism to an overwhelmingly agrarian regime presented a variety of challenges. This question was not unique to the Mongols during the Ming: the Wei Toba of the Northern Dynasties, the Khitan of the Liao dynasty, the Jurchen of the Jin dynasty, the Mongols of the Yuan dynasty, and the Manchu bannermen of the Qing dynasty all faced important decisions about adapting to new economic systems. Their decisions were deeply informed by their divergent attitudes toward agriculture. Ming courts provided some Mongols with both pasturelands and livestock. During the first hundred years or so of the Ming dynasty, the Chinese court on occasion used Mongols as livestock advisors in the Capital Region. However, the relative dearth of such records from the second half of the fifteenth century suggests that Ming Mongols were less frequently used in such a ca-

64 Xianzong shilu, 5.5a–b.
65 Wuzong shilu, 171.3a.
66 Shizong shilu, 22.9a.
67 In an effort to maintain proper Manchu values, the Qing dynasty forbade bannermen and their families from taking up agriculture and commerce. The question remained a live issue up until the closing days of the dynasty and figured in debates surrounding the differences between Chinese and the bannermen. See Edward Rhoads, Manchus and Hans: Ethnic Relations and Political Power In Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861–1928 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000).
68 In 1431, Mongols granted titles of nobility by the Ming court were given pasturelands in the counties around the capital with idle lands. These grants, which ranged from 400 qing for a marquis to 100 qing for a centurion, were in response to complaints that the Mongols had nowhere to graze the livestock supplied by the court. See Xuanzong shilu, 81.3b–4a.
69 Serruys, “The Mongols in China: 1400–1450,” 296–97. He refers to a 1412 report in which “‘Unemployed Tatar officers were selected to teach the people how to raise horses’” in the Northern Metropolitan Area.
pacity. Some have argued that Mongols eventually adopted agriculture rather than continuing more traditional preferences for livestock.\(^{70}\) In some instances the court seems to have actively encouraged this transition. In 1447, the court ordered a high-ranking (Mongol?) officer to oversee “surrendered barbarians” settled in Dongchang and Pingshan Garrison, Shandong, in “cultivating lands as a livelihood.”\(^{71}\) The transition from animal husbandry to agriculture was probably never complete, and varied widely according to region.\(^{72}\)

As a result of greater political stability, gradual economic recovery, and the relocation of the principal capital to Beijing, over the course of the fifteenth century land pressures steadily increased and unused lands in the Capital Region disappeared. Early in the sixteenth century the emperor Wuzong bestowed “idle” lands upon such imperial favorites as eunuchs, royal in-laws, and leading generals. These lands, however, were usually already under intense cultivation by local farmers. Their commendation to imperial favorites and the change in their new tax-free status reflected economic and political machinations rather than demographic trends. In the early sixteenth century, the Directorate of Imperial Horses officially oversaw some 336,000 acres of land, the majority of which had actually fallen into the hands of imperial favorites and military households. Most was now devoted to agriculture.\(^{73}\) During the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, the court had relocated several hundred thousand people into the area surrounding the former Yuan capital of Dadu. During the following decades, tens of thousands of families resettled in the Northern Metropolitan Area and other northern provinces in China, often without regard to imperial wishes.\(^{74}\) One must assume that, as the population grew and pasturage lands shrank, maintaining Mongolian pastoral lifeways became more difficult.

### Household Registration, Taxes, and Labor Service

In the eyes of Chinese officialdom, to be a Mongol meant registration in a Mongol household. From the perspective of the imperial bureaucracy, more

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\(^{70}\) He Guanbiao, *Yuan Ming jian Zhongguo jingnei Mengguren zhi nongye gaikuang*, 19–34. Serruys has observed that early in the fifteenth century, Mongol communities in Gansu “still relied mainly on raising horses, cattle, and sheep” (295). Even after the Mongols turned to agriculture, “as a rule they remained better known for their herds of horses and sheep than for the cultivation of the soil.” See Serruys, “The Mongols of Kansu during the Ming,” 263.

\(^{71}\) *YZSL*, 158.2a.

\(^{72}\) This point requires further research. Evidence from sixteenth-century Muscovy demonstrates that possession of agricultural lands did not mean exclusive pursuit of agriculture. As Janet Martin shows, Tatar-Mongol descendents in Muscovy who converted to Christianity tended to devote more resources to the raising of hay, suggesting that they maintained larger numbers of livestock than did their Russian counterparts. See Martin, “The Novokscheny of Novgorod: Assimilation in the 16th Century,” pp. 23–26.

\(^{73}\) Fang Zhiyuan, “Mingdai de Yumajian,” 143.

\(^{74}\) For a brief overview of these changes see Robinson, *Bandits, Eunuchs, and the Son of Heaven*, 31–36.
important than language, dress, life-style, or territorial origins were administrative categories. Much of the extant information relating to the Mongols in the Northern Metropolitan Area owes its survival not to the Ming government’s great concern with Mongol ethnicity or customs, but with administrative operations. Materials on the Mongols are embedded within these administrative categories.

In this context, it is crucial to remember that, administratively, the overwhelming majority of Ming Mongols were registered in hereditary military households. Active service military households were to contribute at least one able-bodied male for military service in the hundreds of garrisons spread across the empire. Normally, the soldier’s wife and children would reside with him in the garrison, while a second or third male from the family might also accompany him. These accompanying male relatives were to contribute to the upkeep of the active service soldier, often through agricultural work on family plots of land given by the garrison. A critical facet of the Ming bureaucracy, the hereditary military household system involved millions of people, administered extensive lands, and formed a part the Ming penal system (convicts were often sentenced to serve as soldiers). As one official observed in 1521, “Nothing is more essential to foundations of the realm than the Yellow Registers. Among the critical features of Yellow Registers nothing is more important than household registration, and especially imperative is the military household registration.”

Despite great efforts to maintain close track of the active service personnel and others within the military households, local supervision was often lax, contested, or both. Given their access to arms, a modicum of military training, and the tempting target of merchants and tax shipments bound for Beijing, some military households in the Capital Region turned to highway banditry during the Ming.

All the concerns, fears, and biases that informed officials’ views of the military in general and the military households in specific influenced the ways in which Mongol communities were perceived and described, both in official reports and private writings. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Chinese officials remarked that military households in North China “both- ered the people and were difficult to govern,” that they avoided corvée service, that they were inordinately fond of archery, falconry, and horsemanship, that they were “fierce” and “held authorities in contempt,” and often failed to pay their taxes. Based on conditions in Baoding and Hejian, one 1485 report held that due to the deleterious influence of military agricultural households,

neither civilian and military households in the area “engaged in agriculture, but solely in highway robbery.” An early sixteenth report observed that military households in the Capital Region were “by nature arrogant and violent.”

In short, for many Ming officials, military households, with their propensity for crime, violence, and recalcitrance, posed grave administrative challenges.

Administrative categories helped determine levels of taxation, corvée labor obligations, access to imperial courts, and jurisdictional responsibilities. Some Chinese officials inveighed bitterly against what they saw as the unjust and undeserved tax and corvée exemptions that they believed all Mongols enjoyed. Yet by the mid-fifteenth century, Mongols, like their Chinese confreres in the military, were increasingly subject to grain taxes. Early in 1444 the court approved a proposal by the Ministry of Revenue that Mongol households who had opened up uncultivated lands and who had previously paid taxes only in nearly worthless paper money were now to pay in grain at the same rates as “commoner lands.” Each mou of land was to be assessed at five sheng of rice (this was to include both the regular tax and transport fees).

This policy shift sparked protest, as a November 1444 report clearly demonstrates. “Mongol commanders, chiliarchs, and centurians from the Jinwu Posterior Garrison” wrote to the throne, saying that if “the lands that they farmed were all to be taxed [at the same rates as commoners households], [they] feared that their livelihood would become uncertain.” This was probably a veiled threat: if pressed too hard, the Mongols would turn to banditry. They explained that after their forefathers had submitted to the Ming during the Hongwu period they had been stationed in Tongzhou, where they had lived and had been granted permission to open up new lands in order to feed themselves. The throne approved their request for special dispensation, and they continued to enjoy their tax exemptions.

The controversy surrounding the Mongols’ tax status continued intermittently throughout the rest of the century. In 1489, Ma Wensheng (1426–1510), then Minister of War, complained that the dynasty could no longer afford to grant tax and corvée exemptions to all household members of Mongols and Jurchens serving in the imperial bodyguard as valiants. He argued that hereafter, in “the second and third generations to succeed to their duties [as valiants] such benefits would be extended only to three males in each household.”

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76 See Robinson, Bandits, Eunuchs, and the Son of Heaven, 57–58.
77 Mark Elliott suggests that under the Qing tensions between military personnel and civilian populations assumed a more pronounced ethnic character. See Elliott, The Manchu Way, 230–31.
78 YSZL, 111.4a.
79 YZSL, 122.1b.
80 YZSL, 122.1b.
81 Xiaozong shilu, 28.12b.
Some of the tensions arose from reports that foreigners abused their status for financial advantage. For instance, in 1440 a supernumerary officer reported that “surrendered barbarians” settled in a Zhejiang garrison “bought Chinese [boys] and falsely claimed that they were their own sons in order to fraudulently receive salary grain.” Based on the man’s recommendations, the court ordered that “only one son per household from those long surrendered who have established livelihoods” receive salary grain. The purchased Chinese were to be reclassified into their original registration categories.

These administrative concerns often blurred into questions of security, as we see in scattered reports where officials expressed worry over the increasing number of Mongols in the Capital Region. For instance, in 1488 the Minister of War noted with concern the growing number of Mongol soldiers in Hejian, Baoding, and Dingzhou (more than 10,000 young men). He wrote that when they “lacked any other livelihood to support themselves, they turned to banditry and pillage.” He also took pains to mention that these Mongols wore armor and were equipped with bows and arrows. The solution, he stressed, was to insure that officers received their salaries in a timely fashion, and that those Mongols who depended on agriculture had sufficient lands. In 1505 the Chief Minister of the Court of Imperial Entertainments, Ai Pu (js. 1481), again drew attention to the growing population of Mongol officers and supernumerary officers in Beijing and the Capital Region. He proposed that the court relocate many of them to the south. When vacancies in posts in Nanjing appeared or if military campaigns in Jiangnan arose, he suggested, Mongols from Beijing (with their families to follow) were to be transferred to the south. It is not clear whether Ai’s concern was primarily economic or security.

In 1553 (just three years after Ming Mongols assisted in the defense of Beijing against Atlan Khan’s attack) the Grand Coordinator of Baoding, Ai Xuchun (js. 1535), commented, “Mongol officers grow more numerous daily. Their arrogance and fierceness have become established practise [for them]. Furthermore, [Chinese] scoundrels from the hinterlands flee their tax and corvée obligations. They then register [themselves] in [Mongol] households. They incite and induce [the Mongols] to do wrong. This will progressively...

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82 YZSL, 69.6a.
83 YZSL, 69.6a.
84 Report contained in Dai Jin, Huang Ming tiaofa shilei zuan (circa 1531, rpt., Tokyo: Koten koten kenkyûkai, 1966), juan 45, vol. 2, 298. See also Xiaozong shilu, 10.7b.
86 Xiaozong shilu, 223.10a.
lead to unrest.” The official went on to complain that these falsely registered Chinese illegally claimed salary grain from the government without performing any military service. This was to take advantage of the preferential salaries and tax exemptions enjoyed by Mongols in the service of the Ming court. The official proposed that the heads of military defense circuits closely investigate the problems of false registration. He further requested that Mongol officers responsible for overseeing Mongol troops in Baoding and Hejian use military training as a way to keep them under control. This was presumably done as a way to identify these “Chinese idlers” and subject them to some measure of supervision and control. In a separate 1564 memorial, the censor Song Xun also noted the problem of Chinese passing themselves off as Mongols to take advantage of their tax and corvée exemptions. He too proposed that registration be more rigorously administered. At the same time that many Ming bureaucratic regulations sought to maintain distinctions among various populations, the Ming Code explicitly prohibited Mongols and Central Asians from marrying among themselves. One seventeenth-century commentator speculated that the prohibition grew out

87 Shizong shilu, 392.6a–b; Wanli Da Ming huidian, 129.17a–b. Qiu Jun also seems to have viewed the Mongols as easily manipulated. In a memorial regarding the disposition of Mongols in the Liangguang region, Qiu Jun notes “[the Mongols] are fierce, but their nature is extremely simple. Thus, those who are misled and commit misdeeds are always drawn from their ranks.” See Qiu Jun, “Liangguang shiyi shu,” Qiu Wenzhuang gong zoushu, rpt. in Huang Ming Jingshi wenbian, 76.13b.
88 Chinese officials periodically complained that the preferential treatment extended to the Mongols was unfair and constituted a great financial burden to the dynasty. See Serruys, “Was the Ming Against the Mongols Settling in North China?,” 148–49. In theory, all military households were also supposed to receive certain tax and labor service exemptions. Although these exemptions were not observed, military households attempted to avoid tax responsibilities in other ways. One tax evasion scheme involved purchasing civilian lands, but insisting to local officials that they were responsible only for only military taxes which would be submitted to military authorities. Tax evaders would then presumably try to convince military officials that they were not responsible for taxes on civilian lands. See Lü Kun, “Qingjun ditu,” Shi zheng lu, juan 4, cited in Wei Qingyuan, Mingdai huangce zhidu, 68, fn. 3. This question appears several times during the 1530s and 1540s in provisions for the implementation of the Ming Code. See Mingdai lüli huibian, vol. 2, 457 and 467.
89 Defrauding the imperial government through false household registration was an ongoing concern for the Ming and was not limited to either military personnel or Mongol personnel. For examples of cases involving military personnel in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, see Mingdai lüli huibian, vol. 2, 538 (maozhi guanliang); Huang Ming tiaofa shilei zuan, juan 12, vol. 1, 294–97 (taobi chaiyi); juan 16, vol. 1, 407–08 (maozhi guanliang).
90 Wanli Da Ming huidian, 129.17a–b, vol. 4, 1845.
91 For military organizations as a tool of social control during the Ming period see Robinson, Bandits, Eunuchs, and the Son of Heaven, 69–98.
93 “Menggu semuren hunyin,” Hulü san, Mingdai lüli huibian, juan 6, 509. Chinese who were not willing to marry Muslims (Huhiui) and Kipchaks were not to be forced into marriage, but instead permitted to marry among themselves. Drawing on comparisons with the Yuan law codes, Henry Serruys has argued that the phrase “ben lei” is a reference to the Mongol custom of marrying sisters–in–law etc. See Serruys,
fear that their numbers would expand still further. This particular statute found its way into popular encyclopedias of the late Ming. To what degree this law was ever enforced is unclear, but the fear of an increasing minority population, especially near the capital, is worth noting. An entry from the Wanli edition of the Da Ming huidian notes:

During the Yongle reign (1402–1424), [the court] relocated the Daning Regional Military Commission to Baoding. Yingzhou and such garrisons were interspersed [within] the borders of Shuntian [Prefecture]. Upon these lands surrendered barbarians of the Uriyangkhad were placed. [In doing so] those from each these three commanderies, the Duoyan, Taining, and Fuyu, were located separately (i.e., Ming authorities kept the three commanderies’ members separate from each other). Each year they were to offer the court tribute and conduct trade. They were to serve forever as a shield [against incursions from the steppe]. Thereafter, the [size of] the tribes increased daily. The barbarian temperament is duplicitous. They often serve as guides to the northern caitiffs.

Even the Uriyangkhad Mongols, with whom the Ming had established its most stable strategic relations, were considered suspect. Although the preceding passage does not make the point explicitly, one wonders if Chinese officials did not regard the Uriyangkhad Mongols resettled near the capital in Shuntian Prefecture with similar doubts.

“Remains of Mongol Customs in China,” 184, fn. 132. For an examination of other possible motivations behind this statute, see Yang Xuefeng, “Ming lü dui Menggu semuren hunyin shang de xianzhi,” Dalu zazhi 41.3 (19). The question requires further investigation. It may well be the case that both official and popular understanding of the phrase changed significantly over time.

It is worth noting that in 1530 the emperor approved a proposal by the Ministry of Punishments that sought to maintain strict distinction between Chinese and “barbarian” populations. The phrasing of the memorial strongly suggests that this segregation was the government’s standing policy, even if social practise was quite different. It reads in part, “Henceforth, for those who dare to not distinguish between barbarians and Chinese and continue to marry, military officers will be demoted and transferred to another garrison; those registered in commoner households will be exiled to a nearby place; banner soldiers whill be reassigned to border garrisons. Each will serve as penal soldiers.” Although the text of this request does not mention Mongols or Central Asians, it was incorporated into the 1548 edition of the Jiajing xinli under the category of “Mongol and Central Asian Marriage.” See Mingdai lüli huibian, juan 6, 510. The Ministry of Punishment’s request is not included in the Shizong shilu under the third lunar month of 1530.

Gao Ju. Da Minglü jijie fuli (1610; rpt. ?, 37a–b, vol. 2, 711–12. Of course, not all references to this prohibition linked it to concerns of growing foreign populations. See Zhengde Da Ming huidian, “Marriage,” 22.8b, vol. 1, 263.

Wanshu yuanhai, juan 6, lülimen (photographic reprint of copy held in Sonkeikaku bunko; Tokyo: Chûgoku nichiyô ruishô shûsei, vol. 6, 240).

“Zhenrong si, ge zhen fenli, Jizhou,” Wanli Da Ming huidian, 129.1a.
Questions of Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction and responsibility also emerged as questions in such administrative matters as whether resident Mongols, or more precisely which members of Mongol households, were subject to such corvée duties as rotating neighborhood patrols.⁹⁷ In response to reports of Ming Mongols participating in banditry in the Capital Region during the late 1470s, the powerful eunuch Wang Zhi (fl. 1476–1481) submitted a report to the Ministry of War. Wang recommended that Mongol officers be assigned to all military forts in the Capital Region garrisoned by Mongol soldiers. These officers would be held responsible for any future incidents of brigandage, subject to demotion and the suspension of salary.⁹⁸

Wang Zhi’s recommendation seems to have grown out of past difficulties in establishing effective supervision over the 140 or so forts scattered through the Capital Region where Mongol personnel were stationed.⁹⁹ During the mid–1470s, the police chief of Huoxian, less than twenty miles southeast of Beijing, had apparently extended his authority over military personnel in the region, impressing them into neighborhood patrols. Theoretically the police chief, and civil authorities in general, exercised no control over military personnel. It appears, however, that local civil authorities had gradually subjected Mongols and other military families to taxes, “customary gifts” during the fall and summer harvests, as well as to demands for fodder and other items. The police chief also used men registered in military households as members of the local constabulary.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ A statute from the first year of the Yongle reign makes this clear. It notes that a tally should be compiled for Chinese names granted to Mongols to keep for reference. “People of the Central Kingdom will not be able to falsely adopt Tatar names in order to escape supervision.” “Bingbu er tiehuang gengxing fuxing,” Zhengde Da Ming huidian, 107.5b–6a, vol. 2, 441–442; Wanli Da Ming huidian, 123.12a–b, vol. 3, 1752. For the application of the Ming Code and case law to “indigenous populations” and their leaders, see Ju Huanwu, “Mingdai lüli guanyu huawairen de fanzui guiding,” Si yu yan 14.2 (1982), rpt. in Wu Zhihe, ed., Mingshi yanjiu luncong (Taibei: Dali chubanshe, 1982), vol. 1, 311–345.

⁹⁸ Huang Ming tiaofa shilei zuan, juan 45, vol., 624.

⁹⁹ For a list of these forts, see the appendix attached to Wang’s report. Huang Ming tiaofa shilei zuan, juan 45, vol., 625–27.

¹⁰⁰ For a useful discussion of the military population in the context of local administration and demographic history, see Cao Shuji, Zhongguo renkou shi, volume 4, Ming shiqi, 77–79. Following the work of Gu Cheng, Cao distinguishes between (a) military households on active duty in garrisons and (b) military households residing in civil administrative units like counties and subprefectures. The former were subject to military authorities, while the latter fell to the jurisdiction of civil administration. See also Robinson, Bandits, Eunuchs, and the Son of Heaven, 37–41, 56–64. There are also indications that non–active duty members of military households, including the young and old and supernumerary men, were allowed on occasion to register in local civilian administration units where they would pay taxes and supply service labor. See Wan Wencai, Houhuzhi (sixteenth century; rpt. Yangzhou: Jiangsu Guangliang guji keyinshe, 1987), 4.6a–b.
This administrative creep produced frictions, and the matter was drawn to the attention of the Funing Marquis, Zhu Yong (1429–96), the leading general of his day and head of the Three Thousands Division of the Capital Garrisons. Zhu argued that such practices should be prohibited as a clear violation of the division of powers between civil and military authorities.

The Ministry of War’s response to Zhu’s objections began, “To all local authorities throughout the realm: military households are responsible for military services, while commoner households are responsible for commoner services. They do not fall under the same jurisdiction. This is a universally applicable statute.” The ministry argued, however, that local security, including the prevention of fire and crime, constituted the sole exception to this universal rule. Local civil authorities were to be responsible for everyone in their districts, both military and commoner households.

Zhu offered a counter-proposal. He requested that, each month, Mongol officers and supernumerary officers would appear for roster at the Three Thousands Division in the capital. Selected, experienced squad leaders were to ensure that the monthly trips to the capital would occur without incident. In the end, the compromise was that the squad leaders selected by the Three Thousands Division would supervise military personnel, while the police chief was to oversee civilian households. “They shall not be allowed to interfere in each other’s affairs.”

Although this solution seems to have only confirmed the principle of divided jurisdiction, the court insisted that the entire population be registered (including their distinguishing characteristics and original place of registration). Three copies of this register were to be compiled, each to be held by different sets of authorities: the Ministry of War, the Three Thousands Division, and Shuntian Prefectural officials. If the military forts were found guilty of harboring bandits or of failing to provide the military registers, then the police chief was to apprehend the outlaws. If violators were not apprehended, the police were to report directly to the Ministry of War, which would establish appropriate deadlines and punishments if those time limits were not observed.

The question of jurisdiction over military populations in general, and the Mongols in particular, survived into the sixteenth century. In 1528 the Grand Coordinator of Shuntian Prefecture, Wang Yu (1481–1529), noted, “Gu’an and other such places are all critical localities within the Capital Region.

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102 Huang Ming tiaofa shilei zuan, juan 45, vol., 625.
103 Huang Ming tiaofa shilei zuan, juan 45, vol., 625.
terspersed through these places are Capital Garrison imperial troops, Mongol officers, and Central Asians (semuren). [Because] there is absolutely no coordinated control [over these people], brigandage has resulted.”104 This civil official proposed the establishment of a baojia headman and the organization of “idle men” as “stalwarts,” presumably patrolmen in the local security forces. Perhaps most germane to our interests here was his request that “all residents shall be subject to [these] controls.”105 The baojia was to report to the county magistrate on the first and fifteenth of each lunar month, presumably to inform him of local conditions.

The court approved Wang’s recommendations, but the tensions remained. The following March, the court placed “all officials, commoners, Mongol officers and supernumerary officers, Central Asians and other such people” in the counties south of Beijing under the supervision and control of the Vice Commissioner of Shuntian’s Military Defense Circuit.106 The court further ordered the repair of alarm towers, the mobilization of men and mounts, the stockpiling of grain, and the repair of weapons against any attack.107 The opening line of the following passage suggests that the anticipated attack was to originate not north of the Great Wall but with the ill–supervised population south of the capital:108 “South of the capital city, in places such as Pangzhuang, commoners and barbarians lived interspersed, and the drums of war (or alarm) have sounded on several occasions.”109

The Mongols were not universally viewed with suspicion by Ming officialdom. Scattered references from late in the sixteenth century suggest that Mongol personnel had begun to shed their truculent ways in the eyes of some officials.110 In November 1585, the Surveillance Commissioner of the Northern Metropolitan Area, Su Zan, noted that “in Baoding in the past, Mongol officers and supernumerary officers were fierce and difficult to tame, so that we could not use the Regional Commander to keep them under control. In recent years, they have long been tranquil. It is fitting to order this zhen to be garrisoned at Yizhou on a long–term basis (approximately 30 miles due north of the prefectural seat of Baoding), [extending] from the area of Zijing Pass to south the of the county to the uncultivated lands along the [Yi] river.

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104 Shizong shilu, 90.12a–b.  
105 Shizong shilu, 90.12b.  
106 The court was responding to a request by Censor Fu E.  
107 Shizong shilu, 98.9a.  
108 Reports of banditry in the vicinity of Hejian reached the court during the spring of 1528, and at least two high–ranking military officers were dispatched to eradicate the problem. See Tan Qian, Guoque, juan 54, 3377–78. Drought affected the Capital Region during the spring of 1529. See Tan Qian, Guoque, juan 54, 3397.  
109 Shizong shilu, 98.9a.  
110 See also Zhu Guozhen’s views discussed below.
They shall be allocated to the forces [there] to open new agricultural lands.” Su’s proposal regarding the Mongols was one of many suggestions he advanced in an effort to firm up the border defenses of the Northern Metropolitan Area.

By November 1592, the Ming government faced the daunting prospect of war with Japan in the northeast. In order to prevent that eventuality, the Ming court dispatched imperial troops to assist Chosôn forces that had engaged the invading Japanese armies along much of the Korean peninsula. The Ministry of War urged the emperor to transfer forces from several areas of China to the northeastern border region, where they would be available to augment Liaodong troops and, should the need arise, fight alongside Chosôn forces against the Japanese. Among those the emperor ordered mobilized were “Mongol officers and local Mongols” from Baoding. In 1605, the court approved plans to move some Mongol and militia troops from Baoding to Gubei Pass, while the remainder were to remain “between the two Passes,” available for deployment.

To recapitulate, Ming Mongols appear in a variety of government records and in a variety of lights. Officials mention them in military and administrative contexts, ranging from border defense and the suppression of rebellion to accounting concerns and registration procedures. In the wake of such national crises as Esen’s 1449 victory at Tumu and the capture of the Ming emperor, many writers highlighted the Mongols’ barbarian origins, resistance to adopting Chinese ways, and their uncertain loyalties. More often, though, the place of Mongol individuals and communities in Ming governance, specifically how they fit into well-established administrative categories, overshadowed concerns about Mongol ethnicity, customs, and identity. In this context it is crucial that, administratively, the majority of Ming Mongols were registered in hereditary military households. All the concerns, fears, and biases that informed officials’ views of the military influenced the way in which Mongol communities were perceived and described, both in official reports and private writings. It is in this light that we need to understand what might be termed the bureaucratic construction of images of Mongols—descriptions embedded in administrative documents and formed by bureaucratic concerns.

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111 Shenzong shilu, 167.2a.
112 Shenzong shilu, 253.3b–4a. In the same entry, the Ministry of War requested that an official be dispatched to recruit men from Yiwu and Dongyang in Zhejiang Province. Yiwu and Dongyang had first established a reputation for tough soldiers during the mid-sixteenth century, when the famous general Qi Jiguang had recruited the nucleus of his successful anti-piracy forces there.
113 Wanli Da Ming huidian, 229.4a.
114 For description of the derogatory language used in official reports and lingering doubts concerning the Mongols’ loyalty to the Ming dynasty in the decade following the Tumu Incident see Robinson, “Politics, Force, and Ethnicity in Ming China.”
Mongols in Military Appointment Books

A variety of Ming records mention Mongol communities, but few detail the size of individual groups and none supply aggregate numbers for the entire Mongol population in the Capital Region. Military appointment books (wuzhi xuanbu) constitute a critical and little-used source for tracing the place of the Mongols in the Ming military.\(^{115}\) The Academica Sinica in Taiwan holds approximately two dozen originals (most of which are in poor condition), while the Tōyō bunko in Tokyo holds hand-copied versions of 13 books.\(^{116}\) By far the largest and best preserved collection, however, is located in the First Historical Archives in Beijing, which boasts 101 of these books.\(^{117}\)

Appointment books were intended to serve as a convenient reference for the Bureau of Military Appointments during its deliberations related to the promotion and demotion of military officers.\(^{118}\) The appointment books were also consulted during the periodic update of military files. The appointment books draw on a wide variety of documents related to military personnel. Among the most important sources are the Inner, Outer, and Posted Yellow Books, tallies, reports held at the Ministry of War that record battle merit, Verification Reports (shen gao) that were consulted in verifying old files and

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\(^{115}\) Among the first to have made use of the appointment books now housed in the First Historical Archives was Zhang Hongxiang (?–1975), who, in his posthumously published Mingdai ge minzu renshi rushi Zhongyuan kao (Beijing: Zhongyang minzu daxue chubanshe, 1999), drew extensively on these materials for his brief biographical notes.


\(^{117}\) Yu Zhijia provides a copy of the appointment book catalog from the First Historical Archives of Beijing and a convenient table of the books arranged by geographic area. See “Mingdai wuzhi xuanbu,” 47–49. They have been included in the recently published compendium Zhongguo mingdai dangan zonghui (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2001). The archival research for this article was completed (in January 2001 and January 2002) before this compendium was available to me. For an excellent introduction to the Ming Archives Compendium with an extensive bibliography to relevent Chinese and Japanese scholarship, see Amari Hiroki, “Minchō tōan o riyō shita kenkyū no dokō ni tsuite—Chōgoku Minchō tōan sōkai kankō ni yosete—,” Manzokushi kenkyū 1 (2002): 73–91; “Chūgoku Minchō tōan sōkai ni tsuite,” Kyōko shoin 42 (2002): 46–50, 62; “Kichōna Mindai no tōan shiryōshū,” Tōhō 252 (2002).

\(^{118}\) The following description of the function and compilation of the military appointment books is based on Yu Zhijia, Mingdai junhu shiji zhida (Taibei: Xuesheng shuju, 1987), 166–76. See also, Yu, “Mingdai wuzhi xuanbu yu weisuo wuguanzhi de yanju,” Dalu zazhi 99.5 (1999): 201–18.
new appointments, and the Military Penal Service Books (*chong jun bu*)—records of officers stripped of their commissions and banished to serve as ordinary soldiers, often in border garrisons.

By imperial order, in 1570 the Bureau of Military Appointments in Beijing created a special commission to compile the military appointment books as a way to update lapsed, incomplete, scattered, and faulty military files. Once completed, a notarized copy with official seals and stamps was to be sent to the Ministry of War in Beijing, where it would be stored permanently. A second copy was to be kept by the Bureau of Military Appointments. The copy held in the Ministry of War archives was to be consulted during evaluations. To prevent tampering and damage through overuse, clerks could consult the appointment books only at the archives. They were also forbidden from removing the files.

The appointment books extant today were compiled in 1594 on the basis of earlier versions. They provide personnel information on successive generations within officer households that held military posts. The fullest accounts are for those families who at the time of compilation held active posts ranging from garrison jailors to garrison commanders. They often provide information dating from the founding of the dynasty until the 1590s. Most typically, a single page is devoted to the family of the active service officer whose name appears at the top of the page. Immediately below this is a synopsis of such previous compilations as the Inner and Outer Yellow Books.119 Next, listed under “generation one,” “generation two,” etc., is the name of the officer in larger characters, while below follow details on how the individual gained his post (e.g. inherited from a relative, gained as promotion for battlefield merit, etc). The appointment books also include such categories as “[Households whose records have lapsed because of] Distance in Time or Accident.” Most commonly these entries are terse and do not extend beyond the mid–to late fifteenth century. Other supplemental categories include Specially Granted Stipends for widows, daughters, and sons too young to assume command duties. Many of the extant registers were subsequently updated, covering developments well into the 1620s.

In summary, the military appointment books sat atop the documentary pyramid of the Ming military bureaucracy. Quoting and abstracting from a wide

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119 Two copies of the Lesser Yellow (*xiaohuang*)[Register] were made. These were to include information related “to only their incorporation into the military, their surrender to Ming forces, their conquest of critical areas, and their hereditary or non–hereditary posts within the garrison and *suo*. [This information] is to be comprehensively gathered and written out in two copies. One is the Inner Yellow *neihuang*. One is the Outer Yellow *waihuang*. They are to be kept in the Palace Archives (*neifu*).” See Zhengde edition *Da Ming huidian*, 107.4a, “Bingbu ertie tiehuang qinghuang,” vol. 2, 441.
variety of detailed documents (many of which are no longer extant), the appointment books were intended to provide the Bureau of Military Appointments with a one-page vita of every military officer in the empire. This précis was consulted every time an officer household’s status changed. These changes included promotion, demotion, transfer, retirement, or death. The entries in the appointment book also functioned as an index to more detailed documents if circumstances so required.

Although the appointment books are a promising and largely untapped source for Ming social, military, institutional, and ethnic history, one should note several limitations. First, just as the compilation of Yellow Registers was subject to an elaborate system of verification each time information was gathered and processed, from the very lowest administrative level to the final product stored in the Rear Lake archives in Nanjing, information pertaining to officers’ careers was checked each time it ascended another rung in the documentary ladder that would eventually lead to Ministry of War archives in Beijing. In both cases, the battle to prevent falsification and tampering was constant and, at best, should be declared a draw. Officials compiling the books, as well as the scribes who actually copied them out, were subject to the same range of bribes, intimidation, and falsification that plagued other forms of household registration. Second, military appointments, especially in the imperial bodyguards, were often sinecures, based on political considerations and family connections. Finally, it is not clear that officer households registered in a particular garrison actually physically resided there. This was a common phenomenon in the Ming hereditary military system.

The question of residence is particularly germane when considering the community cohesion and ethnic identity of Mongols. Large ethnic communities living in close physical proximity often retain a stronger sense of their identity as outsiders for longer periods of time. However, without further corroborative evidence, one cannot assume large Mongol enclaves existed whenever one sees large numbers of Tatars listed in the appointment book of a particular garrison.

In the end, the appointment books by themselves tell us little about the texture of Mongol communities in Beijing and its environs: How many Mongols actually spoke Mongolian, and how well, by the late sixteenth century? If one were to judge solely by entries in the appointment books, one might conclude that within two or three generations, most Mongols in the

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120 For a brief account of the various stages of the compilation of the Yellow Register based on extensive, newly available materials, see Luan Chengxian, *Mingdai Huangce yanjiu* (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1998), 29–46. For accounts of the safeguards against tampering with the military appointment books, see Yu, “Mingdang de liyong,” 205–213.
Ming military adopted Chinese surnames and personal names, at least for bureaucratic formalities. In fact, administrative guidelines outlined in the Zhengde edition of *The Collected Statutes of the Great Ming Dynasty* (*Daming huidian*) required officials to give Chinese surnames to Mongols who lacked them when updating the Military Yellow Registers.

In the case of [Tatar officers] . . . who possess [Chinese] surnames, continue [to use their] existing [surnames]. In the case of those without [Chinese] surnames, group them into similar groups and petition the throne to grant them [Chinese] surnames. Arrange them according to the Hundred Surnames. For those whose Yellow Registers are not arranged according to similar surnames, above, write out “Such and such,” below [write] “surrendered.” Use the character Tatar to identify their files. In all other ways, register them as the same [Chinese] military officers.”

This regulation strongly suggests that, at least in some cases, Chinese officials rather than Mongols themselves determined the Mongols’ Chinese surnames. We can only wonder if they maintained Mongol names at home and in Mongol communities.

All caveats aside, the appointment books should shed light on such larger questions as the composition of the officer corps of the Ming military, how officers gained or lost their posts, and the relative frequency with which they were relocated from one garrison to another. They will also tell us much about internal migration in general and how regional networks might have spread through the garrison system.

The appointment books held in the First Historical Archives of Beijing verify that Mongols continued to hold posts as military officers in significant numbers until nearly the very end of the dynasty. Below are listed the Northern Metropolitan Area garrisons for which appointment books remain extant.

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121 Zhengde edition *Da Ming huidian*, 107.4b–5a, vol. 2, 441–2; Wanli *Da Ming huidian*, 127.9a–b, vol. 3, 1751. The original passage reads *zhì* “simply” rather than *shàng* “above.” My translation assumes that *zhì* is a scribe’s error for *shàng*. Registers arranged by surname (*leixingce*) rather than by garrison was one variety of register used in the compilation of the general Military Yellow Registers. See Wei Qingyuan, *Mingdai huangce zhidu* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1961), 56. Wei speculates that the Surname Register may have been used as some kind of index or reference tool, though he notes that its specific use is not clear.

122 Designation of Chinese names to Tatars for administrative purpose dated back to the earliest days of the dynasty. See Zhengde edition *Da Ming huidian*, 107.5b, vol. 2, 441; Wanli *Da Ming huidian*, 127.12a, vol. 3, 1752.

123 A statistical analysis of which counties were represented in what numbers in which garrisons at what times would seem an obvious first step in this line of research.
The percentages represent the proportion of Mongols out of all active service officer households listed in the registers.

Baoding Anterior Garrison (72) 10% (of 99)
Baoding Middle Garrison (91.4) 3% (of 145)
Brocade Guard (2.1, 2.2) 37% (of 807)
Changling Garrison (8) 0%
Daning Middle Garrison (59) 13% (of 332)
Fujun Anterior Garrison (1) 5% (of 219)
Fuyu Garrison (60) 14% (of 212)
Jinwu Right Garrison (3.1, 3.2, 3.3) 32% (of 360)
Liushou Middle Garrison (3.9) 9% (of 127)
Liushou Left Garrison (10) 14% (of 96)
Liushou Posterior Garrison (57) 4% (of 181)
Longxing Garrison (48) 0% (of 212)
Miyun Posterior Garrison (65) 2% (of 47)
Shence Garrison (40) 10% (of 144)
Tiance Garrison (87) 0% (of 70)
Tianjin Garrison (70) 2% (of 82)
Tongzhou Garrison (91.3) 48% (of 176)
Wuxiang Right Garrison (7) 4% (of 231)
Xingwu Garrison (58) 11% (of 83)
Xianling Garrison (9) 5% (of 161)
Xiaoqi Garrison (11) 4% (of 73)
Yingzhou Middle Garrison (73) 11% (of 47)
Yanshan Left Garrison (5) 12% (of 303)
Yanshan Anterior Garrison (6.1, 6.2) 5% (of 409)
Yiyong Posterior Garrison (63) 9% (of 332)
Yiyong Right Garrison (62) 8% (of 72)
Yongping Garrison (64) 15% (of 339)
Yulin Anterior Garrison (4) 20% (of 112)
Zhongyi Anterior Garrison (61) 18% (of 124)

Particularly striking is the large number of officer households registered as Mongols serving in the Brocade Guard in Beijing during the very last years of the sixteenth century. Serruys has drawn attention to the unusual concentration of foreigners, mostly Mongols and Jurchens, in the Brocade Guard dur-

\(^{124}\) The numbers in parentheses following the garrison names refer to the call numbers assigned to the registers in the Mingxuanbu section in the archive.
ing the first century of the Ming dynasty. Their later fate, however, has to this point been unknown. According to the 1594 register, more than one third of the 807 men listed as active service officers in the Beijing Brocade Guard were Mongols. Similarly high percentages of Mongol officers were registered in the Jinwu Right and Tongzhou Garrisons, 32% and 48% respectively.

At the same time that the aggregate numbers for the Brocade Guard indicate a surprisingly high percentage of Mongols, the format of the registers suggests the Mongols’ administrative separateness. The registers for the Brocade Guard are divided into two volumes, one with information on approximately 350 officer households and the second covering around 450. Although only 2% of the first volume were of Mongol descent, they comprised a full 65% of the second volume. Also included in the second volume were officers of Jurchen and Muslim descent (about 5% of the total for the second volume). Regulations in the *Collected Statutes of the Ming* related to the updating of military Yellow Registers required officials to separate materials on Tatar officers from those on their Chinese counterparts. The fairly strict separation of Mongols, Jurchens, and Muslims from Chinese officer households in the compilation of the appointment books also seems fitting given the noticeable segregation between Mongol and Chinese units in the Ming armies. It should be noted, however, that Tatar officers are often listed among Chinese names in other appointment books.

Scattered information found in local gazetteers corroborates the significant numbers of Mongols within the military garrisons stationed in the Capital Region until late in the dynasty. For instance, according to the 1540 *Hejian Prefectural Gazetteer*, Hejian Garrison contained the following Mongol personnel: four commanders, six chiliarchs, four centurians, four jailors, and 467 soldiers. Lesser numbers of Mongol troops were also listed for two other garrisons in Hejian Prefecture. The 1607 *Baoding Prefectural Gazetteer* records 1,500 Mongolian troops in the Baoding garrisons. In Dingzhou garrison,
Mongol troops continued to serve in the Ming army up until the fall of the dynasty. Smaller numbers of Ming Mongols are also found in other garrisons throughout the empire. Partial surveys of appointment books for Nanjing, Shaanxi, and Shanxi garrisons yield the following results:

### Nanjing Garrisons
- Brocade Guard (86) 8% (of 209)
- Yulin Anterior Garrison (84) 3% (of 140)

### Shaanxi Garrisons
- Ningxia Middle Farming Garrison (24) 0% (of 68)
- Ningxia Anterior Garrison (22) 2% (of 119)
- Pingliang Garrison (19) 0% (of 97)
- Xi’an Left Garrison (18) 2% (of 106)

### Shanxi Garrison
- Yulin Garrison (82) 2% (of 106)

Larger numbers of officers of foreign descent were almost certainly also present in many of the northeastern garrisons. Located along the northern border of the northernmost regional military commission of the empire, the Garrison of the Three Ten–thousands boasted a large proportion of Jurchen officers—nearly half of active duty officers listed in the appointment book are registered as of Jurchen descent.

It bears repeating that in government documents, administrative categories, not ethnic characteristics, determined one’s status as Mongol or Tatar. In the eyes of Ming bureaucrats, Mongols were Mongols because they were registered as Tatar households. It was an explicit Ming policy to distinguish Tatars from the rest of the population at several stages of household registration. In addition to the examples noted above, it is clear that separate registers were maintained for Tatars. Under the heading “Clarifying Tatar Officers,” we find the following guidelines.

Within the Comprehensive Register for Tatar Officers, the Appointment Books, and the registers verified by the vice ministers, com-

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130 1849 Dingzhou zhi, juan 10–11.
131 Mingdang, wuxuanbu 14, Sanwan wei. Kawagoe Yasuhiro argues that the Jurchens constituted more than 70% of the upper ranks of the officer corps in Sanwan Garrison. See Kawagoe Yasuhiro, “Mindai Jochoku gunkankō jōetsu,” Shien 38.1–2 (1977), 4.
132 Here I follow Ruan Chengxian’s suggestion that the character chi is a clerical error for shi. Personal communication, January 14, 2003.
pare the information supplied for place of origin, former posts, [time and place of] surrender, the reasons for receiving posts, promotions, and transfers.\textsuperscript{133}

Once the Yellow Registers were updated at the garrison, they were to be submitted to the Ministry of War along with a verified and numbered list of Tatar officers. Tatar personnel were treated as a separate category.\textsuperscript{134}

These Mongol households were incorporated into a military system maintained through hereditary obligation to the state. The appointment books for officer households make clear that the category of “Tatar officer” included not only Mongols but also Jurchens, Huihuis, and perhaps others.

\textit{Ming Mongols in Contrasting Light}

The records generated by such an administrative system leave many unanswered questions about exactly what such registration entailed, but clearly large numbers of these Mongols served in strategic military garrisons at the heart of the Ming empire. If the appointment books noted above are any indication, they comprised a significant proportion of some of the most prestigious garrisons in China, such as the Brocade Guard and the Jinwu Garrison. In their capacity as officers in these garrisons, Ming Mongols were deemed sufficiently trustworthy by the court to participate in the administration of one the late imperial state’s most critical political, cultural, and intellectual enterprises—the imperial civil and military examinations.\textsuperscript{135} Mongol officers are periodically listed as Security Officers and Examination Inspectors for provincial and metropolitan examinations.\textsuperscript{136} Another sign of the Mongols’ privileged status and thorough integration into court life is their inclusion in regu-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{133} Zhengde edition \textit{Da Ming huidian}, 107.4b, vol. 2, 441; Wanli edition of the \textit{Da Ming huidian}, 127.9a, vol. 3, 1751.
\item \textsuperscript{134} Zhengde edition \textit{Da Ming huidian}, 107.5a, vol. 2, 441; Wanli edition of \textit{Da Ming huidian}, 127.9b, vol. 3, 1751. Note also a separate provision for the pension of widows of Tatar officers who died without anyone to inherit their post. See Zhengde \textit{Da Ming huidian}, 107.9a, vol. 2, 443. For provisions for funerals for Tatar personnel during the early reigns of dynasty, see \textit{Libu zhigao}, 34.4b–5a (Wenyuange siku quanshu edition).
\item \textsuperscript{135} For a magisterial study of the examination system, see Benjamin Elman, \textit{A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial China} (Berkeley: University of California, 2000). In 1404 the Board of Rites requested that “Security Officers be drawn from the Brocade Guard and such garrisons.” See the Wanli edition of the \textit{Da Ming huidian}, “Metropolitan Examination,” 77.32a, vol. 3, 1236.
\end{itemize}
lations detailing the appropriate place at court banquets. Senior Tatar Officers were seated with fellow Chinese officers of similar rank and imperial relatives.\textsuperscript{137} They also figured in public celebrations in the capital. For instance, according to the well-informed late Ming eunuch Liu Ruoyu, each year on the day before the First Day of Spring, the Shuntian Prefectural government held a riding event outside the Dongzhi Gate to welcome spring. Imperial relatives with meritorious service, eunuchs, Tatar Officers, and military officers all competed in a horse race.\textsuperscript{138} During the mid–sixteenth century, men of Mongol descent even supervised annual memorial services conducted at the Ming imperial mausoleums and on service on the occasion of the Qingming Festival.\textsuperscript{139}

Mongols were thus an integral and, in some contexts, prominent part of imperial society. Their presence was obvious enough that during the early sixteenth century at least one European observer also drew attention to their place in Ming governance and their close ties to the state. Gaspar da Cruz wrote:

In the city of Cantom (sic) I saw many Tatar captives who have no other captivity than to serve for men–at–arms in other places far from Tatary; and they wear for a difference red caps, being otherwise dressed like the Chinese with whom they live. They have for their maintenance a certain stipend of the King, which they have paid to them without fail. The Chinas call them Tatos, for they cannot pronounce the letter r.\textsuperscript{140}

This passage suggests that while Ming Mongols’ headgear marked them off from the Chinese population, another critical element of their identity was military service to the imperial state.

Galeote Pereira too drew attention to the Mongols and military service:

\textsuperscript{137} Wanli edition \textit{Da Ming huidian}, 72.10a–b, “Libu yanli zhuyan tongli,” vol. 2, 1155.
\textsuperscript{139} For instance, in 1528 Wu Shixing, a titled Mongol, was among those merit aristocrats sent to supervise offerings at imperial tombs on Qingming Festival. See \textit{Shizong shilu}, 86.4a. In 1530, Wu Shixing oversaw memorial services for Wuzong. See \textit{Shizong shilu}, 111.11b. It is important to note that at least in the Veritable Records entries, Wu is identified not as a Mongol, but by his merit title—Gongshun Marquis. In 1590, the current Gongshun Marquis, Wu Jijue, supervised sacrifices at the northern suburbs (\textit{Shenzong shilu}, 222.XX).
\textsuperscript{140} \textit{Tractado em que se cõtam muito por êst˜eco as cousas da China}. Translated in Boxer, \textit{South China in the Sixteenth Century}. Second Series, No. CVI, The Hakluyt Society, 1953, 85. For an additional comment on the Tartars’ red caps, see 152.
The Tartars are men very white, good horsemen and archers, confining with China on that side where Pachin standeth, separated from thence by great mountains that are betwixt these kingdoms. Over them be certain ways to pass, and for both sides, castles continually kept with soldiers. In time past, the Tartars were wont always to have wars with the Chins, but these fourscore years past they were quiet, until the second year of our imprisonment.\textsuperscript{141}

If European observers highlighted distinctions between the Mongols and the Chinese on the basis of clothing or complexion of skin, Ming writers seem to have linked various non–Chinese groups within the empire.\textsuperscript{142} Comments by Ye Sheng (1420–74) suggest a tendency to associate Huihui and Tatars. In a brief note about Xi Xin, a Huihui who served as Commissioner–in–chief, and He Yong, a Mongol who held the posts of mobile corps commander of Liangguang and assistant commissioner–in–chief, Ye observed:

Neither man made offerings to Buddha, offered sacrifices to the gods, or knelt down (or prayed?) before the corpses of the deceased. The Huihui said, ‘The customs of all us Huihui are like this. Some among the Tatars [share these customs].’ Buddha was after all a barbarian, so normally they would offer sacrifices to the gods. However, as men who held office but who did not know the rituals of mourning and offerings, they clearly differ from [the practice of] China.\textsuperscript{143}

In his 1565 \textit{Pengchuang rilu}, Chen Quanzhi (js. 1544) also grouped together Muslims and Mongols resident in North China. He wrote:

In recent generations, Muslim barbarians and Tatar caitiffs have lived scattered among the prosperous region of China, such as the two capitals, Hejian, Zhending, Baoding, Linqing, and other such places. They generally gather together in ethnic groups, exalt their

\textsuperscript{141} Done out of Italian into English by Richard Willis (original was Portuguese text). In Boxer, \textit{South China in the Sixteenth Century}. Based on observations made when captured in 1549 (in Guizhou?) written down no later than 1561. Cited in Boxer, \textit{South China in the Sixteenth Century}.

\textsuperscript{142} Serruys has also noted this tendency. See his \textit{Mongols in China}, 56–67, fn. 64.

\textsuperscript{143} Ye Sheng, \textit{Shuidong riji} (between 1465–1472; rpt. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1997, second reprinting), \textit{juan} 6, 63. Ye’s comments appear verbatim in Deng Qiu’s 1570 \textit{Huang Ming yonghua leibian bieji}, 135.6a, vol. 8, 629. Xi Xin’s 1467 obituary notice in the \textit{Veritable Records} and the \textit{Guoque} notes his military contributions but ends on a negative note, observing that Xi possessed a “treacherous nature.” See \textit{Xianzong shilu}, 41.6b–7a; \textit{Guoque, juan} 35, 2231.
own customs, and maintain their own teachings and practices. Clearly they have not taken part in the transformation of China. The thing by which we control them extends only to their body. We now enjoy a time of peace and full prosperity, and they are still recalcitrant like this. If suddenly a crisis arose, what would we do?  

Chen highlights the clearly alien cultural practices of the Tatars and Muslims that sharply separated them from the Chinese population. He does not, however, consistently differentiate between the two.

Clearer examples of conflating the categories of Huihui and Tatars is also seen in such official imperial documents as the military appointment books. For instance, a three–year old Huihui girl is listed as the daughter of a “deceased salaried Tatar full chiliarch of the Nanjing Brocade Guard Prison.” Similarly, the firstborn son of the primary wife of a “salaried Tatar vice commander of the Nanjing Brocade Guard Prison,” An–ke ku–zhu, is described as a Huihui. One scholar has argued that because non–Chinese groups were allowed to marry Chinese and other groups (such as Huihui), many Mongols and Uighurs were counted as Huihui. Examples of blurring the category of Tatars with Jurchens are also plentiful.

### Ming Mongols in Administrative Geographies

The Mongols became firmly established as a distinctive feature of the administrative geography of the Northern Metropolitan Area. Ming geographic works date from the earliest days of the dynasty, and such imperially compiled works as the *Huanyu tongzhi* and the *Da Ming yitong zhi* appear onwards from the mid–fifteenth century. Based on his examination of the genre as a whole and on changes in successive editions of particular works, Ōsawa

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145 Mingdang, wuxuanbu 86, Jiniwei (Nanjing), 30b.
146 Mingdang, wuxuanbu 86, Jinyiwei (Nanjing), 24b.
147 See Mu Dequan, “Mingdai huizu de fenbu,” *Ningxia xuebao (shehui kexue ban)* 3 (1987): 81–88. Serruys has noted that at least during the early Ming, many Mongols used Muslim names. See “Mongols in Kansu during the Ming,” 249; “Some Types of Names Adopted by the Mongols during the Yuan and the Early Ming Periods,” *Monumenta Serica* 17 (1958), 358–59.
149 The *Huanyu tongzhi* was completed in 1456 under the supervision of Chen Xun et al, while the *Da Ming yitong zhi* was compiled under Li Xian in 1461. For brief notes on both works, see Wolfgang Franke, *An Introduction to the Sources of Ming History* (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malay Press, 1968), p. 237.
Akihiro has argued that during the latter half of the dynasty, especially from the 1590s onward, unprecedented numbers of geographic works featured increasingly detailed information on local tax burdens, postal stations, salt administration, the relative difficulty of governance, and discussions of local customs. Ōsawa maintains that this turn away from earlier, more literary geographic works towards more practical books stressing the realities of local governance must be understood in the light of military crisis and the growing popularity of the “statecraft” school, which highlighted the link between scholarship and practical governance.150

The first mention of the Mongol communities in an administrative geography dates from the late 1520s. In July 1529, Grand Secretary and Hanlin scholar Gui E presented maps and descriptions for seventeen areas in the empire to the throne.151 In prefatory material to the description of the Northern Metropolitan Region, Gui observed, “In the region around Hejian, Zhending, and Baoding, there are many military forts in which Mongol troops are garrisoned. Their nature is fierce and difficult to tame.” “Furthermore,” Gui continued, the area “east of Dongan, Bazhou, and Wuqing is desolate and sparsely populated. Thieves and robbers take refuge there. It is very much an affliction of the heart.” 152

In this brief passage, Gui identifies three linked elements that were to reappear with great frequency in geographic writings throughout the remainder of the dynasty. He observed the connection between Mongols and military garrisons, noted the Mongols’ truculent nature, and, through the comment on banditry and problems of local security that immediately proceeds the passage discussing the Mongols, drew attention to the relation between the Mongols and threats to local order.

Gui’s description exercised a broad influence over later geographies. Cai Runan’s 1543 Yudi lüe followed Gui’s description verbatim.153 Zhang Tianfu’s 1557 Guang Huangyu kao also repeated Gui E’s description about the forts

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151 According to the Veritable Records of Shizong, the Jiajing emperor praised Gui’s work as clear, succinct, and of clear use to governing. The emperor kept the maps for his perusal, while a copy set of the maps was to be deposited in the offices of the Grand Secretariat. See Shizong shilu, 102.1b, vol. 76, 2400. See also Gui’s preface in He Tang’s 1579 Xiurang tongkao.
152 Gui E, “Jin yuditu shu,” Gui Wenzhang ji, 4.3b in Huang Ming jingji wenbian 182.3b.
153 1543 manuscript held in Rare Book Collection of Beijing University Library, 1.9a.
garrisoned by Mongols in Hejian, Zhending, and Baoding, as well as the claim that villains seek refuge in the area around Dongan, Bazhou, and Wuqing.  

Similar descriptions of the area may be found in Hu Wenhuan’s late sixteenth-century *Xinke Huangyu yaolan*. Under the “Customs” entry on Baoding Prefecture, Hu writes, “Administratively extremely demanding, the area is located at a busy transportation hub. Military colonies and Mongol garrison forts are interspersed throughout [the region]. [They] are difficult to pacify.” Again drawing on Gui E’s observations from 1529, Hu provides an identical description for Hejian Prefecture. Perhaps because it had already become so well established that explicit mention was no longer necessary, Hu omits mention of the Mongols in his description of Zhending, but follows Gui’s characterization of the region’s inhabitants: “Their wild, fierce, and unyielding practices have not yet been fully reformed.” Hu includes similar descriptions in his general comments to the “Customs” section of the Northern Metropolitan Region in his 1594 *Huayi fengtu zhi*. Among the difficulties of governing the Northern Metropolitan Region, the 1594 *Zhifang kaojing* by Lu Qiyin also refers to the “military colonies and Mongol garrison forts interspersed among the region.”

The portrayal of Mongol communities as an administrative problem continued in seventeenth century works on geography. These include Cheng Bai’er’s *Fangyu shengliüe* (preface 1612) and Guo Zizhang’s 1615 *Junxian shiming*. In other cases, such as Lu Huaxi’s 1621 *Muying xiaoji*, Mongols are mentioned only in passing, as one facet of the particular difficulties of a

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154 Zhang Tianfu, “Beizhilu tushuo,” microfilm held at the East Asian Library and the Gest Collection, Princeton University, Princeton, 2.2a–b.
155 A Hishi copy of *Huang yu yaolan* is held at Jinbunken, Kyoto; original held in the Naikaku Collection, Tokyo. My thanks to Osawa Akihiro for bringing this entry to my attention.
156 *Xinke Huangyu yaolan* (1613 preface: Hishi copy held at Kyoto Jinbunken; original held in Naikaku Collection), 1.3b.
157 *Xinke Huangyu yaolan*.
158 *Xinke Huangyu yaolan*, 1.5b.
159 *Huayi fengtu zhi* (Hishi copy held at Jinbunken, Kyoto; original held in Naikaku Collection, Tokyo, Japan), 1.1a. He further notes the presence of “foreign soldiers” interspersed among the populations of Baoding Prefecture and Qingyuan County (1.6a), and “Mongol soldiers” interspersed among the population of Dingzhou (1.11b). The *Huayi fengtu zhi* forms part of a large collectanea compiled by Hu. Beijing University Rare Book Collection holds a Wanli period edition. For the complete contents of the collection see, *Beijing daxue tushuguan cang guji shanben shumu* (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1999), 525–26.
160 *Zhifang kaojing* (microfilm held at East Asian Library and the Gest Collection, Princeton University), 1.14b.

Osawa stresses that Lu Qi compiled this work in response to the military crisis of Hideyoshi’s Korean invasions, the problems in the Northwest, and the literati’s lack of military knowledge. See Osawa, “Shishōshigaku kara yochishigaku e,” 18.
161 Cheng Baier, *Fangyu shengliüe* (Hishi copy held as Kyoto Jinbunken: original held in Naikaku Collection, Tokyo), 1.1b. Guo Zizhang, *Junxian shiming*, 1615 preface: Hishi copy held at Kyoto Jinbunken; original held in Naikaku Collection, 1.2a.
region’s administration.\textsuperscript{162} Citing the high quality of Gui’s observations, Chen Zushou chose to quote Gui’s remarks in his 1635 \textit{Huang Ming zhifang ditu}.\textsuperscript{163}

Gui E’s description of the Mongols found its way into the geography section of a wide variety of Ming period general encyclopedias.\textsuperscript{164} These include Wang Qi’s famous 1609 \textit{Sancai tuhui} and Zhang Huang’s 1613 \textit{Tushubian}.\textsuperscript{165} Zhu Jian similarly drew upon Gui in his 1639 \textit{Gujin zhiping lüe} (without noting the source of his information).\textsuperscript{166} A slight variation of the pattern is found in Chen Renxi’s \textit{Qianque julei} (blocks cut in 1630). Chen includes the comment: “[because in Zhending and Baoding] military colonies and Mongol forts interspersed [as closely] as the teeth of a dog, [the region’s] pacification is difficult.” He attributes the observation to Yang Bo (1509–1574), rather than Gui E, although slightly later in the same passage he excerpts a portion of Gui’s comments on the Northern Metropolitan region (with full acknowledgment).\textsuperscript{167} Chen also included the comments on the Mongols as an excerpt from \textit{Tushubian} in his 1626 compilation \textit{Jingshi babian leizuan}.\textsuperscript{168} An abbreviated variation appears in Zou Quan’s \textit{Gujin jingshi geyao},\textsuperscript{169} while a rendi-

\textsuperscript{162} Lu Huaxi, \textit{Muying xiaoji} (Hishi copy held at Jinhunken, Kyoto, Japan. Original held at the Naikaku Collection, Tokyo, Japan), 1.33b. Mention of the Mongols appears in the description of the difficulties of administering Dingzhou.

\textsuperscript{163} Chen Zushou, \textit{Huang Ming zhifang ditu} (microfilm held at East Asian Library and the Gest Collection, Princeton University), shang, 21a.

\textsuperscript{164} For a brief introduction to \textit{leishu} during the Ming period, see Dai Keyu and Tang Jian’er, eds., \textit{Leishu de yan’ge} (Sichuan: Sichuansheng tushuguan xuehui, 1981), 60–79. For a much more detailed bibliographic examination, see Sakai Tadao, “Mindai no nichiyō ruisho to shomin kyōiku,” in Hayashi Tomoharu, ed., \textit{Kinsei Chūgoku kyōiku kenkyū} (Tokyo: Kokutosha, 1958), 27–154. Sakai stresses that far more people were reading encyclopedias during the Ming than earlier periods and that they were compiled not only for preparation for the civil service examinations but for everyday reference.


\textsuperscript{168} Chen Renxi, \textit{Jingshi babian leizuan}, 105.1a. That the comments originated in Gui’s work is not noted. Reprinted in \textit{Xuxiu Siku quanshu}, vol. 1242, 462.

tion stressing the challenges to local security is contained in Wu Chucai’s Wanli period Jiangshi lüe. Gui’s remarks appeared too in the most influential military encyclopedia compiled during the Ming dynasty, Wang’s 1599 Dengtan bijiu and Mao Yuanyi’s 1621 Wubeizhi. Finally, Chen Zilong selected Gui’s prefatory remarks to his provincial maps for inclusion in the largest statecraft compilation of the Ming dynasty, his 1639 Huang Ming jingshi wenbian.

What explains the great frequency with which Gui’s descriptions appear in late Ming works? Part of the answer is prestige and status. Although the text was relatively simple and the maps rudimentary, Gui’s work was an official document that gained the praise of the Shizong emperor. By the mid-sixteenth century, information (and a wide variety of other products) intended for the throne’s use were available for sale on an open market. The imperial cachet sold. Gui’s geography appeared no later than 1566 as a separate one-juan work entitled Guangyu tu, which may have increased its prominence.

More fundamental to the dissemination of these particular images of Ming Mongols was the impact of commercial publishing in China. Beginning in the mid-sixteenth century and continuing for the remainder of the dynasty, a wide variety of books was produced in great numbers. Texts, illustrations, and printed information circulated more widely and reached more people than in the past. One recent study has estimated that approximately 35,000 titles appeared during the Ming. Gui’s remarks rode this publishing and information wave.

The profound influence of the market in shaping the transmission of knowledge in late imperial China bore directly on the spread of these descriptions of the Mongols through such a wide variety of printed sources. Such scholars as Osawa Akihiro are correct to note that some editors of geographical works talked of their commitment to “practical statecraft” during the mid- and late 176
Ming. The appearance of more realistic, observation–based geographies of the late Ming has been interpreted as a harbinger of the evidential scholarship that would attain fuller growth during the Qing.\(^{177}\)

One must, however, also bear in mind that commercial printers and publishers produced items they believed would make money. In this search for profit, the famous publishing families of Jianyang crammed more columns on a page, produced simplified fonts, cut smaller characters, printed on thinner pages, and used poorer quality ink. They also rearranged pre–existing materials to sell in new editions. Not only were texts frequently reprinted, stock illustrations were also used again and again for novels, encyclopedias, and other printed materials.\(^{178}\) Driven by increasing competition, professional writers and publishers who specialized in examination aids simultaneously responded to and subtly influenced the demands of their audience by including an unprecedentedly wide range of interpretations of the classics.\(^{179}\) Profits and market strategy prompted Hu Wenhuan, a publisher and book collector based in Nanjing and Hangzhou, to change repeatedly both the content and organization of his collectanea, the *Gezhi congshu*.\(^{180}\)

For all these reasons, Gui E’s comments of 1529 in an official court report enjoyed extraordinary longevity. For the next century, editors incorporated them verbatim in a wide variety of works, ranging from administrative geographies and general encyclopedias to military treatises. The prevalence of Gui’s description is both a useful reminder of the interplay between official and private writings and a warning against accepting detailed “local descriptions” as being either accurate or even local. Given the uniformity and ubiquity of Gui’s depiction in extant materials, it seems reasonable to assume that when readers in Ming China turned their attention either to the Ming Mongols or to Hejian, Baoding, and Zhending, Gui’s images sprang to mind first. In a word, Gui inadvertently created the most common stereotypes of the Ming Mongols in all of China. One can only wonder what influence these stereotypes may have exercised upon future officials as they perused the geographic works noted above.

Unsuspecting readers might easily conclude from these descriptions that Mongol communities were readily identifiable, primarily due to their close


links with imperial military institutions and their failure to adopt Chinese customs and moral attributes. The Mongols emerge in these imperially sponsored and privately compiled geographic accounts as untamed and arrogant people who posed a potential danger to local communities and to the dynasty itself. The image of Mongol communities, ensconced in their forts, inextricably linked them to contemporary perceptions of Ming military personnel and their reputation for unruly and often illegal behavior.

In the following note on forms of address, the editors of the 1550 Guangping Prefectural Gazetteer explicitly linked military garrisons, Mongols, and pernicious cultural practices:

Old customs from the former [Yuan] dynasty have yet to be completely cleansed. Local custom whereby one’s father is called “Uncle” and Uncle is called Governor (or Sir, daye) is already disrespectful. There are some who go so far as to imitate the customs of the military garrisons. They call one’s father “Elder Brother” and one’s mother “Elder Sister.” Even more despicable [than this] are the many women who button their garments on the left. These are all lingering customs from the Yuan dynasty that should be eradicated.\textsuperscript{181}

It is striking, however, that the editors did not blame continuing Yuan practices among the people of North China on the Tatar officers. As noted above, even when commentators like Ye Sheng (writing in the latter half of the fifteenth century) and Chen Quanzhi (writing in the mid-sixteenth century) drew attention to the fact that the cultural practices of the Ming Mongols differed from those of the Chinese, they did not argue that the Mongols’ clothing, beliefs, or language threatened to spread among local populations. This delinking is important because on several occasions during the fifteenth century, the court felt compelled to address Mongol customs in North China and in the capital in particular.

Evidence that the Mongols of Hejian and Baoding were widely perceived as an administrative challenge for Ming bureaucrats may be seen in their appearance as a question on the Shanxi provincial examinations administered by Lu Shen in 1531. Potential officials were clearly expected, indeed required, to have considered the management of non-Chinese communities in the empire.\textsuperscript{182} One might also note that the term “Tatar Officer” daguan is among those glossed in the 1539 Korean primer on Chinese bureaucratic correspon-

\textsuperscript{181} 1550 Guangping fuzhi, 16.7b. Reprinted in Tianyige cang Mingdai fangzhi xuankan.

\textsuperscript{182} Lu Shen, “Hejian Baoding Daguan,” Lu Wenyu gong wenji, rpt. in Huang Ming Jingshi wenbian, 155. 19b–20a. Lu does not provide a date for when he posed this question on the examinations, but a funerary
dence, *Yimun chinam*, where it is defined as “Mongols: those who turn to China, travel to the capital, receive posts, and live [in China].”\(^{183}\)

Writing in the seventeenth century, Zhu Guozhen (1558–1632) described the Ming Mongols as a potentially dangerous problem for which the state had happily developed a successful solution: military institutions as a form of social control. He observed with some measure of self-satisfaction:

Late during the Eastern Han (25–220 C.E.), surrendering barbarians were settled in the hinterlands [of China]. In time, they learned to study and grew conversant with [matters of the] past and present. As a result, during the Jin dynasty (265–419), there occurred the Revolt of the Five Barbarian [Tribes](late in the third and early in the fourth centuries C.E.).\(^{184}\) During our dynasty, surrendering barbarians were relocated to the hinterlands in great numbers. Because [the court] was generous in its stipends and awards, [the Mongols are content to] merely amuse themselves with archery and hunting. The brave\(^{185}\) among them gain recognition through [service in] the military. [They] serve as assistant regional commanders and regional vice commanders. Although they do not hold the seals of command, they may serve as senior officers. Some among those who receive investiture in the nobility of merit may occasionally hold the seals of command. However [because the court] places heavy emphasis on maintaining centralized control of the armies, [the Mongols] do not dare commit misdeeds. As a consequence, during the Tumu Incident, while there was unrest everywhere, it still did not amount to a major revolt. Additionally, [the Mongols] were relocated to Guangdong and Guangxi on military campaign. Thus, for more than 200 years, we have had peace throughout the realm. The dynastic forefathers’ policies are the product of successive generations of guarding against the unexpected. [Our policies] are more thorough than those of the Han. The foundations of merit surpass the Sima family (founders of the Eastern Jin) ten thousand fold. In a word, one cannot generalize [about the policies towards surrendering barbarians].\(^{186}\)

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\(^{184}\) For comments on the Xiongnu revolts, see Pan, “Early Chinese Settlement Policies,” 54–56.

\(^{185}\) The term *jie* is slightly ambiguous, meaning “violent,” “brave,” and “outstanding.” See *Hanyu dacidian*, vol. 4, 987.

Contrasting the management of foreign communities under the Eastern Han and the Ming dynasties, Zhu argued that the barbarians’ behavior is not fixed. By keeping Mongols in the military and granting them generous emoluments and awards, the Ming was able to make good use of their martial abilities without endangering the dynasty. Here again, Zhu’s remarks resonate with the contemporary view that military institutions should serve as effective tools of social control, even over foreign communities. Chu Quan (1457–1513) wrote with approval that military service with the imperial army transformed the Mongols into useful and controllable troops. In a proposal drafted early in the 1530s, a vice–minister of the Bureau of War, Xu Wen, similarly argued that successful exploitation of the Mongols required a combination of generous rewards for martial prowess and strict control through close supervision and training. Xu also noted that the Mongol men could be effectively bound to Ming service through “the ties of their wives, children, and homes.”

One late Ming observer highlighted the efficacy of the court’s socio–economic policy vis–à–vis the Mongols in the Capital Region, writing, “The Loyal and Obedient troops (zhongshun jun), granted land and salaries, are [now] no different than the locals.” That he singled out the Mongols as a distinct population gives lie to his remark that they were no different that the locals.

Concluding Comments

Writings on Ming Mongols shed light on several facets of late imperial Chinese society. The first is a clarification of how we characterize geography during the late Ming. Ōsawa ascribes the appearance of more “practical” geographies to keener interest in the realities of local conditions and a greater commitment to improved administration during the late Ming. He sees the geographies as a reflection of a growing “statecraft” movement. In a brief discussion of late Ming developments in geography, Hostetler observes, “Personal experience and careful documentation were the criteria of the Chinese literati audience, most of whom would have identified with the kaozheng movement.” Elman too seems to cast the late Ming as a kind of transition

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187 See Robinson, *Bandits, Eunuchs, and the Son of Heaven*, 84. See also Liu Dingzhi (1409–1469)’s suggestion that “to restrain them (Ming Mongols), we should intersperse them among the units of troops of the Central Kingdom.” Cited in Robinson, “Force and Ethnicity in Ming China,” 85.
188 See Xu Wen, “Xiuju wubei yi wuwang buyu shu,” rpt. in *JSWB*, 173.9a–b.
189 Xiang Dushou, “Wang Ji,” *Jinxian beiyi* (1583; reprinted in *Beijing tushuguan guji zhenben congkan* (Beijing: Shumu wenxian chubanshe, 1988–91), 30.8a, vol. 48, 541. Xiang’s editorial comment was appended to his short biography of the fifteenth century statesman Wang Ji. Xiang approved of Wang’s successful proposal to continue to settle Mongols in Hejian and Dezhou in the face of those who doubted the Mongols’ political allegiance in the immediate wake of the Tumu Incident and wished to station them on the northern border.
190 Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise*, 58. Hostetler is right to note that ethnographic description during the Ming drew on both direct observation and non–verifiable sources (90).
from the metaphysical or “symbolic geography” that dominated during the Song and Ming periods to a more objective and historically grounded geography.\footnote{Elman, “Geographical Research in the Ming–Ch’ing Period,” 11. Shin too couches developments in the geography of the southwest during the late Ming in terms of an “increased emphasis on empirical knowledge.” Shin, “Tribalizing the Frontier,” 178–79. He also notes the close links of travel and the military demands of the Ming state to more detailed geographic and ethnographic description during the closing decades of the Ming.}

These scholars are correct to connect new styles of geographies with larger intellectual and social trends, yet there is more to the story. This new “practical knowledge” was not necessarily reliable, practical, or objective. As the example of the Ming Mongols demonstrates, these local descriptions grew increasingly removed from reality over time. They developed into literary tropes that acquired lives of their own. Rather than carefully updated observations about subject Mongols, they became frozen images whose longevity was unnaturally extended by the intellectual and commercial forces that made the compilation of geographic and encyclopedic works profitable. This lack of current and accurate data also marked the majority of the “merchant manuals” and route books of the Ming period.\footnote{See Martin Heijdra’s review of Timothy Brook’s \textit{Geographical Sources of Ming–Qing History} in \textit{Ming Studies} 29 (1990): 65–69.} It seems likely that the semblance of currency and precision may have satisfied the demands of many contemporary readers.

Further, many readers did not seek current information in their geographies at all. For every encyclopedia from the latter half of the Ming that included geographies with even a modicum of information on contemporary socioeconomic conditions, several others featured geographies which drew exclusively on pre–Ming, often pre–Song, materials. Perhaps most often published were those with a more literary bent. It is telling that the \textit{Da Ming yitongzhi} rather than the more “practical” geographies was among the books most commonly found in the collections of government school libraries.\footnote{See Timothy Brook, “Edifying Knowledge: The Building of School Libraries in Ming China,” \textit{Late Imperial China} 17.1 (1996), table two.}

A second and related issue emerges from a consideration of the wide proliferation of descriptions of the Ming Mongols—the profound influence that the state could exercise, unintentionally, upon the generation and transmission of ostensibly private cultural knowledge.\footnote{In the context of the construction of county libraries to house government school collections, Brook has stressed the state’s ambitions in the realm of knowledge. He observes, “When they built edifices to house books, most magistrates were participating in the state’s project to edify and control knowledge, but not to open men’s minds.” Timothy Brook, “Edifying Knowledge: The Building of School Libraries in Ming China,” 116.} Gui E penned his descriptions of the empire’s geography for the emperor’s perusal; his maps and comments were available for convenient reference by the country’s highest officials. For the next century, however, they found their way into privately compiled and commercially published works in a variety of genres. Sometimes editors
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noted the descriptions’ origins, and sometimes they did not. The net result, however, was the same. A state document was transformed into a source of private profit, while official information became public knowledge.

Commercial publishing accelerated this diffusion of information. The late Ming’s thriving publishing industry not only created new reading communities, it spread images and ideas widely through Chinese society (and probably to some degree Korea, Vietnam, and Japan). Scholars have long commented upon the connections between advances in printing technology during the Song dynasty and the spread of Confucian values. More recently, Chow has noted that accompanying the broader publishing market of the late Ming was a growing variety of glosses and commentaries to the classics used for examination preparation. These, he argues, eroded the imperially defined Confucian orthodoxy. Close study of how leishu, administrative geographies, and other apparently “factual” works shaped contemporaneous opinions and perceptions related to ethnicity and ethnic stereotype should supplement what we know about the influence of the Beijing Gazette and the more general question of the social consequences of publishing’s rapid expansion.

Finally, we must consider the state’s role in the formation of images of non–Chinese populations. This paper has argued that in official reports, cultural/administrative geographies, and various kinds of encyclopedias, descriptions of Mongols owed much to how they became elements of administrative routine. Perceptions were often constructed and maintained in response to demands that had little to do with the Mongols themselves. Most Mongols, regardless of their previous clan or tribal affiliations, were registered as hereditary military Tatar households. All the negative qualities that Ming officials associated with Chinese military households were consciously and unconsciously also applied to the Mongols. The descriptions of Ming Mongols (and one suspects a wide variety of other groups) should be understood not as ethnographic observations but most fundamentally as the product of the bureaucrat’s mind and classification schemes.

Drawing on a variety of twentieth-century examples, many scholars have stressed the importance of state–imposed census categories in the creation of

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195 Chow, “Writing for Success.”

196 For a pioneering study on the Beijing Gazette (dibao), see Yin Yungong, Zhongguo Mingdai xinwen chuanboshi (Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe, 1990).

197 As a contrasting example, one might note the approximately 3000 wealthy households from Jiangnan relocated to Beijing during Yongle reign as a way to repopulate the region and contribute to its economic viability. Court records refer to them as “suburb households.” They were registered in the capital with the two counties of Wanping and Daxing. By the late fifteenth century, their numbers had dwindled to little more than 200 households; by 1574, only five households remained. See Shenzong shilu, 19.2b. Their example suggests that administrative imperatives alone were insufficient to maintain group identity when other supporting factors were not involved.

Shin also notes that a primary determinant of one’s status as a “Chinese” household in the southwest was the decision to render taxes to the central government. See Shin, “Tribalizing the Frontier,” 95, 112, 133.
national and ethnic identity. They argue that in time these various classificatory labels can help shape self-perception and self-representation among those placed in particular categories. Was such a dynamic at work in the case of the Ming “Tatars”? Registration in hereditary military households within the imperial armies may have provided an institutional foundation upon which disparate steppe clans and tribes developed some sense of themselves as Mongols with corporate interests. Anthropological and sociological studies suggest that military institutions often foster the development of a corporate identity.

This has proven particularly true for so-called “martial races,” minority groups singled out for their exceptional martial prowess who serve in the military of a dominant ethnic power. Based on her analysis of such groups as the Gurkhas, Bedouins, and Scots, Cynthia Enloe argues, “The consequence for the group targeted to be a ‘martial race’ is often an increased sense of ethnic cohesion bought at the price of growing vulnerability to state manipulation.” The Ming Mongols differed importantly from the profile Enloe sketches for martial races elsewhere. The Ming court bestowed upon Mongol elites high-ranking positions in the military, hereditary titles, and generous stipends, allowed Mongol officers to command Mongol troops, and garrisoned them in vital points within the capital and its environs. Yet one suspects that the Ming court’s policy of at least partial segregation of Mongol contingents under Mongol officers, the continued use of “Tatars” as an administrative category, and the state’s use of Mongol cavalry units as vanguard forces against particularly dangerous foes (at least through the early sixteenth century) did foster a stronger sense of Mongol identity.

Whatever sense of corporate identity that the Ming Mongols may have developed did not preclude considerable appropriation of contemporary Chinese culture and practices. Indeed, such appropriation was essential to the Mongols’ survival. Extant records make clear that Mongol families learned to

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200 These specific points are all at variance with Enloe’s description of martial races in the employ of powerful empires elsewhere in the world. See Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers, 25–48.

201 Although the Ming court deeply influenced Mongol identity, its policies do not seem entirely amenable to “instrumentalism,” as an approach which understands ethnicity “as a purely political phenomenon” or “the manipulation of collective identity by some agent to achieve power or enforce social discipline.” See Virginia Tilley, “The terms of debate: untangling language about ethnicity and ethnic movements,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 23.3 (1997), 507.
navigate both civilian and military bureaucratic institutions. They successfully secured tax and corvée privileges and maintained their posts as officers for as many as a dozen generations. They also found influential patrons at the court to protect their interests. By late in the dynasty, some Mongol military families earned praise for exemplary Confucian behavior.

This is not, however, to say that they became “indistinguishable from Han [Chinese].” Neither is it to say that in the eyes of the Ming state and literate elites Mongols should be indistinguishable from the larger Chinese population. In fact, as we have seen, the Ming bureaucracy consciously preserved (if not created) distinctions between the Tatar personnel and Chinese populations, even within the larger category of military households.

It is not surprising, then, how closely Tatar personnel became linked to the Ming state. In addition to the examples mentioned above, a brief entry in a 1633 encyclopedia notes with some concern the physical proximity of Mongol residences to administrative and military headquarters in Guangzhou. It is no accident that the Mongols “all lived in the provincial city and resided to the right and left of warehouses and treasuries of the Provincial Administration Commission, of Guangzhou Prefecture, and of the two garrisons.” These Mongol communities were created and supported by the Ming state.

Mongols themselves prove relatively elusive in the Chinese records, and there are real limits about what we can say with confidence about Mongol ethnicity under the Ming. We can identify areas where they were congregated in sizeable numbers, point to signs that at least through the fifteenth century some preserved such elements of a distinct Mongol identity as language, clothing, and hairstyles, and plot in general terms when and how they intersected

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202 This is the position taken by He Guanbiao, Yuan Ming jian Zhongguo jingnei Mengguren zhi nongye gaikuang, 2. Pointing to the fact that Jurchens in Sanwan Garrison generally adopted Chinese surnames by the third generation, Kawagoe Yasuhiro similarly argues that Jurchens “consciously strove to Sinicize [themselves].” His position is not persuasive. See his “Mindai Jochoku gunkankō josetsu,” 17–18. Hsiao Ch’i–ch’ing too has argued that under the Ming, descendents of elite Mongols “lost their Mongol identity” and that average Mongol households “completely merged into mainstream Han society.” Hsiao, “Lun Yuandai Mengguren zhi hanhua,” 263. For a critique of Sinicization, see Pamela Crossley, “Thinking about Ethnicity in Early Modern China,” Late Imperial China 11.1 (1990): 1–35, esp. 2–5.

203 Janet Martin has noted that during the sixteenth century, Muscovy state attitudes and policies towards the Mongols exhibited similar ambivalence. Elite Muslim Tatars were accepted into the most exclusive social circles of Muscovy despite Orthodox ideology that explicitly denied such status to those who had not converted. At the same time, Orthodox Tatars, who received lands from the crown, were identified in administrative categories distinct from those of regular Muscovite servicemen. See Martin, “Multiethnicity in Muscovy: A Consideration of Christian and Muslim Tatars in the 1550s–1580s,” Journal of Early Modern History 5.1 (2001): 1–23.


205 More than half a century ago, Henry Serruys argued that the larger and more cohesive Mongol communities of Gansu assimilated into Chinese society much more slowly than those in the Capital Region.
with critical bureaucratic structures. Yet, on such critical questions as community cohesion, the reconstruction of identity, shifting political alliances, and others, Chinese sources for Mongol communities are largely silent. Nothing comparable to the detailed and sustained documentary record related to Manchu ethnicity has come to light (or is likely to) for Mongols serving the Ming dynasty. This silence is not merely a matter of what materials have survived the ravages of time; it reflects fundamental differences in the ruling elites and ethnic discourses between the Ming and Qing dynasties, a subject that exceeds the parameters of this essay.

Military culture, or, more narrowly, garrison culture in late imperial China is a rich subject, perhaps most thoroughly explored by scholars of the Qing, usually in the context of Manchu identity. As both Crossley and Elliott have shown, military communities’ physical location, scale, and levels of interaction with other local populations exercised a profound influence over their sense of identity. Based on available materials, this essay has demonstrated that the Ming Mongols were also closely linked in fact and in perception to a critical imperial institution, the hereditary military garrison system. Contemporaneous Ming observers often noted that garrison ways were distinct from surrounding civilian populations (usually bemoaning their deleterious influence). Thus, we may reasonably speculate that whatever degree of corporate Mongol identity existed owed much to both the Ming’s institutional preference to distinguish Tatar personnel from other populations and to garrison communities.

Both the Ming and the Qing were multi-ethnic empires that devoted considerable resources to the management of groups that differed from the ruling elite in terms of language, religion, political philosophy, and social structures. In both empires, the construction or maintenance of ethnic identity often went hand in hand with administrative apparati. The relationship between the two, however, changed importantly from the Ming to Qing, as a non-Chinese minority ruling elite struggled to maintain a galvanizing sense of ethnic identity through imperial support for the Manchu Way. We know much about these efforts and Manchu self-perceptions because Manchus controlled the resources of the state and produced a voluminous textual, architectural, and artistic record.

The Ming state did not encourage a separate ethnic identity for its Mongol subjects. It systematically distinguished Tatar from Chinese subjects, and in-

Serruys remarks, “[Mongols] of Kansu largely kept their national character throughout the Ming and Ch’ing periods.” Serruys, “The Mongols of Kansu during the Ming,” *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* 10 (1955), 341.


It is worth noting that Tatars, both Muslim and Orthodox, resident in sixteenth century Muscovy were also closely associated with military service. See Martin, “Multiethnicity in Muscovy.”
individual officials periodically raised concerns about the Mongols’ political allegiance. However, differences in language, clothing, and lifeways were only infrequently addressed in imperial rhetoric. Instead, the Ming state focused on the incorporation of non–Chinese populations into pre–established bureaucratic categories within the imperial administrative system in ways that profited the state and subjected them to a modicum of control. Perhaps it is the comparative dearth of explicitly ethnic rhetoric that has obscured the fact that the Ming dynasty encompassed a variety of non–Chinese peoples from its first days to its last.

To Ming administrators and to local Chinese populations, these groups were a well–established part of the social landscape. It seems likely that cultural stereotypes about the Ming Mongols like those spread in the administrative geographies influenced how Chinese officials and other literate members of society thought about Mongols. A logical next step in understanding the place of non–Chinese groups in the Ming should be nuanced examinations of how various social strata perceived these groups, and how such attitudes influenced social interaction and government policies. Scholars in the field already reject common crude generalizations and stereotypes that somehow still pop up in more general works (e.g. “the Chinese” despised or ignored their neighbors, the Ming was inward–looking and ignorant of the outside world, etc). This kind of textured analysis will not only sharpen our view of diversity within the Ming but also yield a more sophisticated understanding of the relation between orthodox rhetoric maintained in official government writings and literati works and attitudes that emerge in less studied circumstances. One suspects too that when we look more closely, we shall discover that both Ming society (in the capital, along the borders, and in the hinterlands) and the Ming court (the imperial family, high officials, palace eunuchs, and military elites) were far more deeply engaged with things foreign than commonly believed. Efforts to contain Ming Mongols through separate bureaucratic tracking within the empire and the ongoing theme of maintaining proper hierarchical distinctions between China and her neighbors almost certainly grew out of a far messier reality where such niceties were not so scrupulously observed.

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208 For a recent example of considering the impact of broader cultural attitudes on foreign policy, see Andrew Rotter, *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947–1964* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000).

209 For an attempt to demonstrate this point, see David Robinson, “The Ming Imperial Family and the Yuan Legacy.”
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Shiren

Shirenshi

Shirenshi ni suru yochi shigaku e-chiri no ni ereru Mimasu

Shirenshi ni suru yochi shigaku e-chiri no ni ereru Mimasu

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Shirenshi ni suru yochi shigaku e-chiri no ni ereru Mimasu
Wang Minghe
Wong Qi
Wong Shihuen
Wong Wai
Wong Zhi
Wen Qingyuans
Wen Rousheng
Wakasuki
Wu Chong
Wu Deyi
Wu Shuang
Wu Yunsheng
Wu Zhong
Wuhan Riged Garrison
Wuwanshu
Wuzhi Jiasu
Xin
Xinliang Garrison
Xiang Zhihau
Xiehong
Xiao Gai
Xiao Qiang (Hibei Chiu-Chung)
Xiao Shanzhao
Xiaodao Lijian
Xiaokao Leganmenqing tao Kuijia yi bei chehounu shu
Xiaoke Hainanuyen
Xiangnan Garrison
Xiaowei yiji youwang luoyu shu
Xianzong tonghaoo
Xiaozhi
Xue Wen
Xue Zhen
Xue Shuqunshu
Xue Tuanfu
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