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# FRAMES, CONTEXTS, COMMUNITY, JUSTICE

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There is a photograph of Jacques Derrida, aged about three, in a toy car at his childhood home in Algiers [fig. 1]. It is not an unusual photograph; in fact, its typicality is striking. It is the kind of photograph one might find in most family albums. Little boys are often found in toy cars, just as little girls are frequently holding a doll, or dancing.[1] The codes of a family album, transposed to an academic album, highlight the manner in which typicality itself tells a story of framing, of gendered gestures, of senses of belonging, of familial legend making, and of intellectual genealogy.[2] And such codes provide a frame for a general contextual understanding of the photograph and therefore

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*1. In her essay "The Gesture in Psychoanalysis," Luce Irigaray discusses the importance of such gendered "gestures." Discussing the different relations to symbolization of boys and girls through a reading of the boy Ernst's game of* fort und da *described by Freud in "Beyond the Pleasure Principle," she writes:*

> She plays with a doll, transferring the maternal affects to a quasi-subject, which allows her to organize a sort of symbolic space. The game is not just culturally imposed on girls; it also signifies a difference in the status as subjects of boys and girls at the time of separation from the mother; for girls, the mother is a subject who cannot readily be reduced to a object, and a doll is not an object in the way that a reel, a toy car, a weapon, and so on, are objects and tools of symbolization. . . . She dances, thereby constructing for herself a vital subjective space, space which is open to the cosmic maternal world, to the gods, to the other who may be present. This dance is also a way of creating for herself her own territory in relation to the mother. *[132]*

*In this context, it is striking that Hélène Cixous, in a photographic essay about the family album and personal genealogy and an Algerian and European background, includes a photograph of herself dancing with her (female) friends [see Cixous, "Albums and Legends" 197].*

*2. An intellectual genealogy seems to be what is at stake in Félix González-Torres's selection of childhood photographs of contributors to the volume* Out There: Marginalization and Contemporary Cultures *[Ferguson et al.]. I am sympathetic with the project of reminding us that what Cornel West calls "faceless universalism" more often than not conceals an "ethnic chauvinism" that must be resisted [West 36]. But I do not find that giving universalism a "face" is the best way to reconceive politics, nor does it necessarily free anyone of "ethnic chauvinism." Another example of reading the childhood photograph as a way of understanding later works can be found in Walter Benjamin's essay on Franz Kafka, in which Benjamin discusses a childhood photograph of Kafka. Speculating on the typicality of the photograph, Benjamin writes, "It was probably made in one of those nineteenth-century studios whose draperies and palm trees, tapestries and easels placed them somewhere between a torture chamber and a throne room" [118]. Benjamin sees a continuity between the fantasy encapsulated in the gestures of childhood and Kafka's later literary interventions.*



***Figure 1.*** *Photograph of Jacques Derrida aged 3. Printed in Geoffrey Bennington and Jacques Derrida,* Jacques Derrida *(Paris: Seuil, 1991) 9.*

for what Barthes calls its *studium*.[3] But, as Barthes remarked in his *Camera Lucida,* a book about photography and about his dead mother, there is frequently something else in a photograph: the *punctum*. It wounds a viewer, and remains in the viewer's memory when he or she looks away from the photograph. It is a singular relationality, and, for the mourning Barthes, encloses the possibility of a hopeful reciprocity. For me, however, beyond the gendered coding of this photograph, it is not the promise of a reciprocity, but the demand of something unknowable that exists potentially beyond the frame of the photograph. A rectangular void that appears to be the back window of a large car opens onto an unknown. The opening itself is a wounding of the frame.

The photograph includes multiple frames, in the sense that a doubling occurs with one frame in the foreground, with Derrida in his toy car, and another frame in the background, with a real car. The child in his car is enclosed in this scene through perpendicular lines, as if framing him in a safe world. The real car is separated by these lines, as if in a square on its own. And through the rear window of this car, there is another enclosure, a rectangular opening, which alerts the viewer to an infinite regression of frames, each enclosing its own image and its own universe, each thematizing the mobility that suggests it could move beyond its immediate frame. This superimposition of a toy car onto an adult scene of mobility not only alerts the viewer to the thematic exploration of infinite generational migration and immigration but also presents us with a visual doubling and echoing, itself suggesting the excess that always exceeds the frame. The frame may appear to exist on its own terms, permitting or excluding hospitality to its hostile excess, and yet what persists in this photograph is the permeability of the frame and its necessary acknowledgment of the other at its border, which both frames and unframes.

A frame both determines and supplements meaning. It is both host to meaning and simultaneously hostile to its narrow condition. This rendition of the frame visualizes both its enclosed protective nature as host, and its permeability to the outside, to a potentially hostile supplement. Derrida's thinking has explored the concepts of framing and hospitality in a manner that has often called attention to, and yet not engaged with, women as a sometimes hostile supplement. The concept of hospitality, whether political, academic, domestic, or psychical, has allowed, however, for a consideration of something that supplements this thinking, and indeed this boyhood photograph of potential mobility: the various frames in which Algerian women have been situated, and their different relation to gesture, mobility, and symbolization in the modern period. This article engages with Derrida's work on framing and hospitality in order to reach its supplement, allowing for a consideration of the political stakes of doing feminist work across borders. The stakes of the philosophical apparatus that seem pertinent to the ethical work of postcolonial feminism are permeated with questions of framing and hospitality. Academic hospitality means an openness to one's subject matter, which would include an openness to those who want, in some way, to take a stand for Algeria in the current climate of civil war and internal conflict,[4] or to analyze the region's cultural, political, or economic history. This article addresses the importance of an academic hospitality through a reading of Derrida's concepts of frame, hospitality, and supplement. It argues for what Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has called a "setting to

3. "(S)tudium *. . . doesn't mean 'study,' but application to a thing, taste for someone, a kind of general, enthusiastic commitment, of course, but without special acuity. It is by* studium *that I am interested in so many photographs, whether I receive them as political testimony or enjoy them as good historical scenes: for it is culturally (this connotation is present in* studium*) that I participate in the figures, the faces, the gestures, the settings, the actions" [Barthes 26]. On the distinction between* studium *and* punctum, *also see Mavor.*

*4. The idea of taking a stand for Algeria was examined by Jacques Derrida in his address to the ICSAI (International Committee in Support of Algerian Intellectuals) and the League of*

work of deconstruction" [*Critique of Postcolonial Reason* 431].[5] This putting to work of deconstruction would have to be accountable to a feminism engaged with and open to the challenges of crossing borders, and of opening oneself up to the risk of damage to oneself, and of desubjectivation, in this encounter. I will be putting deconstruction to work here ultimately to propose a feminist internationalism, departing from the marxist internationals of another moment. But in order to reach this supplement of woman, the challenges of framing, of auto- and bionarrative, and the antinomy represented through framing need to be addressed. If the subtext of this article is to develop a form of academic hospitality that allows for a sense of solidarity and openness to imagine a very different future, Derrida's *nostalgérie* becomes a pretext for thinking about coloniality and the structures of thought that constitute the supplement of foreigner.

The framing of politics, disciplines, and nation-states has become permeable for some and effectively less permeable for others, with a new form of selective hospitality in place. The notion of a selective hospitality goes against the very idea of hospitality, of course. It introduces into it limits and codes, whether it be those overruled by Zeus (whose most important epithet, Xenios, means "the protector of strangers"),[6] or those of the commercial context of a hospitality suite.

What follows is a consideration of—and an ethics of openness to—four kinds of supplementation, which constitute the framework of this article: *Parergon One: "Frame"; Parergon Two: "Example"; Parergon Three: "Foreigner;" and Parergon Four: "Woman."* The supplements together form a kind of poetics of the parergon. The phrase "the poetics of the parergon" is suggestive of the deconstructive methodologies addressed here, and is "put to work" to formulate a theory for feminist work across borders. This article and these *parergons* address why deconstructive methodologies, and their trace of coloniality, are useful in understanding the complex history of the colonial and postcolonial relationship between France and Algeria, and in thinking about the hostile supplement of woman and how frames and borders are traversed.

Derrida himself has gestured toward the importance of analyzing the relationship between his native Algeria and France, although he has for the most part not centered his reading on a geographical context.

> *If I had the time, and if it were appropriate to give a slightly autobiographical note to my remarks, I would have liked to study the recent history of Algeria from this point of view [the hostage structure]. Its impacts upon the present life of two countries, Algeria and France, are still acute, and in fact still to come. In what had been, under French law, not a protectorate but a group of French departments, the history of the foreigner, so to speak, the history of citizenship, the future of borders separating complete citizens from second-zone or non-citizens, from 1830 until today, has a complexity, a mobility, an entanglement that are unparalleled, as far as I know, in the world, and in the course of the history of humanity.* [Derrida, *Of Hospitality* 142–43]

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*Human Rights on February 7, 1994. The text is published as "Taking a Stand for Algeria."*

5. *Spivak's appendix to* A Critique of Postcolonial Reason *[423–31] gives a clarifying discussion of the development of some of the principles of deconstruction, and of the political potential of Derrida's work. It is here that Spivak discusses "critical intimacy" as one of the primary ethico-political tools available in reading practices.*

6. Xenia *refers to the law of hospitality to strangers that is so fundamental in Greek literature, particularly in Homer's* The Odyssey. *Its root (*ghos-ti*) is also that of the Latin* hostis *(enemy),* guest, hotel, host, *and* hospitality.

Derrida's Algerian origins are referred to here, although it remains unclear how they relate to this unparalleled entanglement. The idea of an origin, and specifically the status of an autobiographical example, has for the most part been handled with suspicion in deconstructive circles because of the narrative teleology of identitarian identification with community which such writing often prefaces, and because of the dismissing of singularity which often accompanies the autobiographical contextualization of a life. Hélène Cixous's comments on looking through her family album are instructive in this regard as she elaborates on her identification with both her mother's Ashkenazi German Jewish background and her father's Sephardic Algerian Jewish background. Tracing a "genealogy of graves" in distant lands, she can relate to her past beyond the framework of the self and of familial ties to a "sort of world-wide resonance . . . the echoes always came from the whole earth. From all the survivors" [Cixous, *Rootprints* 189]. The example of Derrida's Algerian origin here helps to discern the postcolonial politics of deconstruction, the question of what frames and supplements have to do with coloniality, and how the supplement as foreigner carries conceptually the trace of coloniality. The teleology of this thinking will not lead to a foundationalist claim about the Algerian origins of Derridean deconstruction (although there is clearly one to be made if foundationalism were adequate here). Thinking about the supplemented frame through the example of the foreigner allows for theorization of a postcolonial anticommunitarian and anti-identitarian responsibility open to others.

*Parergon One: Frame*

Derrida quotes this parenthetical (and *parergonal*) remark from his *Glas* in *The Truth in Painting*:

> *(Imagine the damage caused by a theft which robbed you only of your frames, or rather of their joints, and of any possibility of reframing your valuables or your art objects.)* [Derrida, *The Truth in Painting* 18][7]

The loss of frame, and particularly of its binding joints, is damage, and a loss of protection. This could be loss of a conceptual framework when reading or writing, loss of a painting or a collage frame that may cause it to disintegrate, loss of national protection if the joints of borders are compromised, or loss of police integrity if evidence is compromised, revealing a case as a frame-up. But this passive mood employed to explicate Derrida's idea substitutes "the loss of" for Derrida's "a theft," in which causality is clearly implied—"damage caused by a theft." Fear of "theft" is not fear of losing that which is protected by frames—"your valuables," for example, "art objects," mementos, loved ones, or things of monetary or sentimental value. The damage is done by theft of that which secures a protective enclosure. Losing the frame might perhaps not mean losing the painting, the house, or the home, but only the possibility of protecting them; losing the skeleton and perhaps, therefore, the core of the life; or losing the laws that govern and create borders and the ability to make new ones, but perhaps maintaining the safety of those they apparently protect. What is projected in Derrida's musing is not the loss of those valuables (although there is a logical possibility that they too would be lost at some point), but the protective and restrictive structures enclosing them, al-

7. *Qtd. in Derrida,* Glas *109. Leavey and Rand translate* dégâts *as "havoc" rather than as "damage" [*Glas *94]. I prefer Bennington and McLeod's rendition in the translation given in* The Truth in Painting.

lowing things usually considered "off-frame" (to use the language of cinema) to move into this permeable frame, opening it up to risk. That this would feel like an affront is presented in the language of "damage"; the damage of being robbed of protection (even if one is safe). The function of the frame, and the sense of what constitutes the frame at any given moment, would be deferred, so that the valuables would be "out of joints."[8]

This section on *parergon* of the frame discerns the implications of threatened borders, their antinomies, and the opening up of oneself to potential risk and damage by the supplement or trace threatening the border. But this "opening oneself up to" cannot entail a complete embrace of a principle of hospitality, because materiality always intervenes to erect frames and delimit access. It is this "non-dialectizable antinomy" [Derrida, *Of Hospitality* 77] that marks the importance of and contamination by the "prosthesis of origin" as well as the originary trace, and distinguishes it from the always corruptible violence of metaphysics.[9]

This idea of "damage," on a conceptual level, begs the question of how "damage" to a frame functions within a particular context. In *Framing the Sign,* Jonathan Culler suggests that framing our arguments or our histories reveals where we are coming from conceptually. If "context" appears transparently as a backdrop for an argument, we elide the fact that retrieval of this background molds it: it is inevitably a back formation in which origin is created with some element of inevitable falsification as it creates a notion of the prior within the terms of the present or the future. The past is proffered as an appendage carried into the present and the future, but it functions more as a prosthesis, an additional support added for strength and often to take the place of something irretrievably lost; it makes its presence felt as a haunting intervention in the current force field. A context is created both to elucidate the past (sometimes in the terms of the present, sometimes as a way of giving a history of the present) and to offer that past up as some kind of explanation, whether causally related to the thing explored or not. Without a frame, context appears as empiricism without interpretation: at worst, a divisive selective presentation of naturalized facts through the frame of transparency. The etymology of "frame" refers to this idea of an established order or a plan, and the methodology of its construction. The notions of advantage, benefit, and profit are also associated with the word. The activity of framing has advantages, therefore, because it

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8. *I am obliquely referring to the line from Shakespeare's* Hamlet, *"The time is out of joint" [act 1, scene 5, line 188]. The reference is made through a reading of Derrida's* Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International. *In this text, Derrida extends Hamlet's musing about a temporal notion of a political remainder. Hamlet refers to the political disarray in the state of Denmark to which the ghost of his father bears witness, and demands that justice be done. Derrida refers to how the figure of Marx is the remainder of the current political climate of late-capitalist globalization. Like* Hamlet*'s ghost, absent and yet uncannily corporeal, Marx's ghost demands justice. This is both a commentary on the past and present exploitative techniques of global capital (literally, the remainder are those figures who are left out of those receiving a slice of the pie), and also an ethical demand made on the future. As long as capitalist exploitation remains encrypted within the framework of capitalism, the ghost of Marx demands responsibility.*

9. *While some find Derrida's more recent engagement with Lévinasian ethics somewhat disturbing in its religious and metaphysical overtones, I find a continuity between the early work on Lévinas in "Violence and Metaphysics" and the work implicated in theories of the messianic. Derrida's engagement with concepts like the* ethico-political *as well as* justice *rather than the* ethical *as something to be embraced mark the insistence of the trace always interrupting the frame of religious and philosophical ethical paradigms. Geoffrey Bennington's* Interrupting Derrida *includes a very useful chapter on "Deconstruction and Ethics," which lays out the continuities in Derrida's thought.*

supplies us with a frame of reference from which to work. It makes explicit the frame of mind of the person constructing the argument.[10]

Culler also writes of negative framing: the police frame-up, or manufacturing evidence. The frame-up compromises the legal system, leading to wrongful accusation and condemnation of an innocent. The compromise is negatively viewed because the accused may subsequently be condemned on "wrongful grounds." Here, the theft is of the legal framework, and the frame itself (whether it protects or not) has become the thing of value. On the occasions when the "frame-up" is discovered (usually through some supplementary information that exceeds the frame-up), legal structures are validated and sanctified. There is little provision for assessing the "frame" itself—the claims it makes, and its ability to adapt to damage caused by the supplement challenging of its norms. The discovery of a frame-up leads to a liberal response—to save the frame—even if those it apparently protects are not protected by it. But this would always leave the supplement outside of the frame. And the frame would remain unresponsive to its own corruptibility and exclusionary framework.

In social psychology and in the Symbolic Interactionist school in sociology, Erving Goffman analyzed forms of self-presentation and the framing of an image of another person using the language of film analysis. Following Gregory Bateson's notion of framing—or the organizing principles of social situations—he discussed how "strips" (like film strips) are understood differently depending on the context within which the viewer views, that is, the location of filming or of projection. For Goffman, a strip refers to "any arbitrary slice or cut from the stream of ongoing activity . . . not . . . a natural division . . ." [Goffman 10]. The context allows a framing of interactions with someone: what precedes the strip influences the interpretation of the person and the event witnessed, and thus an assessment of behavior appropriate to the interaction. Multiple frames must be both socially and temporally analyzed if they are not to put each other at risk, threatening the borders of another frame. An example of these numerous frames is a game. If I walk into a room, and I hear someone say "X is dead," I may very well presume that X is, indeed, dead. I would therefore adopt an appropriate mode of behavior, and would probably consider the laughter of another in the room to be tactless or an improper breaking out of the frame.[11] However, if I then understand that a game of Murder is being played, I am less likely to make such an error. The frame of the utterance determines how it is expected to be read, and what would be the appropriate response. To some extent, all understanding takes place "out of context," as everything that is said will be understood in the context of one's own (mis)understanding. One can never really know the full context of any utterance, whether another person's or one's own. So while a frame determines a meaning, it is also a supplement that throws it into undecidability.

The cinematic frame, from which Goffman draws his terminology, as well as the photographic frame, captures a moment of a more extended event leading to a "cut," or an interruption of the frame by a supplement outside. The supplement can be understood as more than an interruption by an alternative framework of force field, however. It is also the cut of nonknowledge, something that opens the possibility of knowledge but is not simply reducible to any currently existing knowledge formation or paradigm. It is a nonknowledge that threatens borders. While it is therefore all about stasis, capturing a moment or holding a particular instance hostage, the frame also exceeds

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*10. The* OED *gives a 1632 definition of* frame *as "upbringing," taken from William Lithgow: "Thou Tharsus, brookes a glorious name, For that great Saint, who in Thee had his frame" [Lithgow, v. 182].*

*11. Goffman discusses various forms of "Breaking Frame" in his chapter of that title [345–77].*

itself—through what happens "off-frame," a sound or voice [see Silverman] complicating an image, or through the *punctum,* as analyzed by Barthes, an apparently insignificant signifier piercing or wounding the viewer. This piercing, for Barthes, is at first unlocatable, as if it is responding to memories or nostalgia etched into the body of the viewer, thus causing an interruption in the force field of the *studium*. It also introduces a different time-frame,[12] and a spectral presence that indicates being out-of-joint. Photographs, in particular, capture something irretrievably lost, allowing for a grasp of a real past in the present. Nostalgia grows to encompass the remnant. (Given the negative connotations of nostalgia, we could remind ourselves of its original meaning and Greek root—the pain or longing to return home. The OED defines *nostalgia* as an illness: "a form of melancholia caused by prolonged absence from one's home or country; severe home-sickness." Uncannily, nostalgia is given a more critical edge than is suggested by its contemporary form as sentimental longing. It is a wound rather than simply a romanticization. Perhaps, then, an example of nostalgia could include an encrypted critical relation to that home for which the nostalgic longs.)[13]

Derrida has analyzed the frame in painting through Kant as an example of *parergon*; it is a supplement to the work itself, even though it may interrupt the work—the *ergon*—and question its boundaries, its "truth" or its "meaning." The *parergon* also includes other supplements, for example, the example. In his reading of Kant's *Critique of Judgement,* Derrida explores whether the supplements (frames, examples, parenthetical notations) implicate the apparent meaning theorized within the main frame assaulting the borders of its enclosed frame of reference. In a section on the notion of beauty in Kant, he explains that the "cut" caused by something outside the force field of the work contains the unknown. The "cut" does not simply engender an already formulated alternative. It opens the work up to possibility of a different intervention or response as yet unknown, and is stripped of recognizable utility. This, in effect, is why it is beautiful, and as yet unclassifiable. "It is finality-without-end which is *said to be* beautiful . . . . So it is the *without* that counts for beauty; neither the finality nor the end, neither the lacking goal nor the lack of a goal but the edging in *sans* of the pure cut. . . the *sans* of the finality-*sans*-end" [Derrida, *Truth in Painting* 88–89]. The aesthetics of the *parergon* is especially concerned with this cut or interruption. It is a nonknowledge intervening into the force field of the work enclosed within a frame. Not without agency, the supplement is nonetheless without intentionality at the moment it cuts through the border. It is a threat to the borders unencumbered by content or interest, even as it accomplishes the undoing of the stasis of the border.

An early use of the word frame explicitly refers to this idea of threatened borders. The 1430 *Hymns to the Virgin and Christ* uses an obscure, now obsolete, definition of frame: "Þhe deuelis gadriden þer greet frame, And heelden þer perlament in þhe myst [The devils gathered their great army, and held their meeting in the mist]" [lines

*12. The different time-frame is also important in Goffman's* Frame Analysis. *Barthes's attachment to the* punctum *is demonstrated through the fact that he does not reproduce the image he discusses most extensively in* Camera Lucida, *Van der See's "Winter garden" photograph. Because the experience of the* punctum *is nonreproducible, the reproduction of what he says is an unremarkable photograph, would be pointless. For Barthes, this respect for the* punctum *is associated with the death of the mother. (The book was written following her death, and was Barthes's last published text. There is always the sense that the* punctum *involves a kind of haunting presence of the mother, one that cannot be subsumed into any existing paradigm of knowledge.)*

*13. Carol Mavor drew my attention to this categorization of nostalgia as a subdivision of melancholy. On nostalgia as an illness and on its transformation from a bodily to a psychical condition, see Lowenthal, "Nostalgia"; and Vromen.*

97–98].[14] "Frame" is a warlike array, or a host. The devils gather it around them so they can hold their meeting and protect their borders from a race engendered by Jesus, who is himself of doubtful paternity. With the introduction of the idea of host, hospitality and hostility are associated with the border that can accept or reject the "foreigner"—the figure who wants to penetrate the warlike array to cross over to another side. In this instance, the paternity and presence of the foreign child, Jesus, is under discussion. The devils are threatened by his presence and resolve to defend their place. "Ordeyne we us wiþ al oure gere / For hidir he þinkiþ to make a race / Arise we alle þat ben bounden heere, / And foond we to defende oure place [Prepare ourselves with all our things, For he thinks of making a race here, All of us who are bound in the place, arise!, And prepare to defend our place]" ["A Song Called þhe Deueilis Perlament, Or Parlamentum of Feendis" 236–40].

The warlike array exists solely by virtue of the potential permeability of the border that it, in fact, constitutes. It functions like any army that apparently protects the people who "belong" within the borders, who are deemed worthy of protection by its army, and who have entered into some kind of agreement or social contract (as a citizen, or, in rare cases, as a refugee or "asylum seeker") with the state or with the host country. The contract includes provisions to abide by the laws of that country and to defend its borders, in exchange for protection and political representation. The protective frame is a force field. Often, those who are protected by the same frame (in other words, those who are included in the civil society that political society apparently protects) are understood to be a community with shared values. And those outside of it are foreigners (sometimes subalterns). At worst, these foreigners are aggressors; at best, they are guests. They may be perceived negatively as parasites, or as incidental beneficiaries in a symbiotic relation.[15] More often than not, they are perceived as wanting to gain something from their relationship with the host, even in instances when the host needs the guest (to supplement the labor force as a "reserve army of labor" [Marx, *Capital* 1: 711–24, 781–94]; or, for example, as "guest workers," "mothers," "resident aliens," or indeed, as "illegal aliens"). The example above also suggests the possibility that the political society is constituted by devils rather than a host of heavenly creatures, or god(s). Frames may create a lack of clarity concerning who is being protected and for what ends, or indeed whether any form of protection is being exerted. It is possible, indeed, that a guest, as much as a host, would be held hostage by the devils, gods, soldiers, police, enforcers, aggressors, or strangers. They may, indeed, end up being *hostia,* sacrificial victims (human or animal).

The term *host* carries its double as its inverse. In the example of the Middle English "frame" cited above, there is an armed company of devils. But a host may equally be heavenly. A host lodges someone in their (broadly conceived) "home," but also is a term used for its corollary–the guest. (This is more apparent in the French *hôte* than in the English "host," but it holds true in both languages. The Latin *hostis* is a foreigner, stranger, the enemy, in fact, of the state.)[16] So the host is someone who opens up frames

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*14. There is some question as to the meaning of "frame" in this context. Furnivall is inconclusive about its meaning, but he glosses the term with reference to "freme," meaning profit or advantage [Furnivall 132]. The* OED, *however, suggests the meaning of a "warlike array, or host" with direct reference to and citation of the reference from "A Song Called þhe Deueilis Perlament,* Or *Parlamentum of Feendis."*

*15. The terms* parasitic *and* symbiotic *derive from the manner in which host animals sustain others.*

*16. In* The Antichrist, *Nietzsche proposes that Christ did not die for "our sins," but in fact, because of his politics was an enemy of the state. He died, therefore, because his political views threatened the status quo with foreign ideas, in other words, as a political prisoner: ". . . [T]his man was certainly a political criminal, at least in so far as it was possible to be one in so* absurdly unpolitical *a community. This is what brought him to the cross. . . ." [Nietzsche 45].*

or borders. Rather like a *parergon,* the host/guest is a supplement to that which is protected within the frame. And the host "community," like the *ergon,* is challenged by the arrival or presence of a supplement at its borders. Equally, the permeability of the borders challenges their function. (What do they protect other than themselves? And what damage does their theft cause?)

The opening afforded by the host has origins in the word's etymology. The Latin *ostio* is a door with a frame, a starting gate, the entrance into the underworld (rather like the "frame" of the devils), or a mouth or river mouth. The orality of the host body (politic) is suggestive of the ability to take into one's midst physically (or, perhaps, psychically, given the oral metaphorics of engaging with otherness we see in psychoanalysis, the eating of the host in communion, or the swallowing of the talisman in Islam) and communicability–the mouth offers a possibility of interaction, rather in the way that a host computer in a mainframe allows (depending on where you live, of course) for the potential communicative coming together of numerous inlets and outlets. It presents the possibility of communication (or perhaps—and this "perhaps" is important, of course, even in a community) beyond the frame or border.

The double-edged nature of the term "host," like the double-edged nature of the term "frame" (protector/excluder, host/guest, communication/failure of communication, naturalized/formulated, internal structure/outer rim), indicates how hospitality and hostility vie with each other, because the "Law" of unlimited hospitality conflicts with its actualized laws. Derrida suggests that there is

> *an insoluble antinomy, a non-dialectizable antinomy between, on the one hand,* The *law of unlimited hospitality (to give the new arrival all of one's home and oneself, to give him or her one's own, our own, without asking a name, or compensation, or the fulfillment of even the smallest condition), and on the other hand, the law*s *(in the plural), those rights and duties that are always conditioned and conditional, as they are defined by Greco-Roman tradition and even Judeo-Christian one, by all of law and all philosophy of law up to Kant and Hegel in particular, across the family, civil society, and the State*. [Derrida, Of Hospitality 77]

The protective mechanisms of borders, like those of frames, introduce antinomy into the picture because of potential damage. When an individual or a group resists the presence of the foreigner into their home, it is because they entertain the idea that they may cause damage, hold *them* hostage, rob *them,* or leave *them* "out of joints." *Their* collectivity is indeed threatened. Derrida proposes the following as a mental exercise:

> *Let us say yes* to who or what turns up, *before any determination, before any anticipation, before any* identification, *whether or not it has to do with a foreigner, an immigrant, an invited guest, or an unexpected visitor, whether or not the new arrival is the citizen of another country, a human, animal, or divine creature, a living or dead thing, male or female*. [Derrida, *Of Hospitality* 77]

Acceptance without identification, and before risk is conceived, is, for Derrida, the law of hospitality. This is a law without empathy, without the empathetic identification upon which community, communion, democracy, and, indeed, the market, are based. It is the welcoming of potential damage prior to its conception. It is not a greater or more capacious empathy that includes more types of strangers. It is before *identification,* and, importantly, before kinship. It is as though the host and the event of hospitality

were an opening, a door frame or threshold, a mouth, an invagination, between a Freudian *fort und da* rather than an enclosure. And the feminine gesture at the border may well be different from the back and forth of the fort und da, enacting a different kind of relation to presence and absence, and a different kind of playfulness and shape than one driven by enclosure.[17] It is the *parergon* not as extraneous to, but as a part of, and as a substitutable part of that may challenge the meaning of that which is enclosed or protected by the *parergon*.

*Parergon Two: Example*

In *The Coming Community,* Giorgio Agamben positions the form of antinomy that emerges in doubling as the antinomy between the universal and the particular. If examples are called upon to explain in particular terms things with more general implications, the singularity of the example poses questions concerning the universal, and puts universal and particular at odds with each other.

> *One concept that escapes the antinomy of the universal and the particular has long been familiar to us: the example. In any context where it exerts its force, the example is characterized by the fact that it holds for all cases of the same type, and, at the same time, it is included among these. It is one singularity among others, which, however, stands for each of them and serves for all. On one hand, every example is treated in effect as a real particular case; but on the other, it remains understood that it cannot serve in its particularity. Neither particular nor universal, the example is a singular object that presents itself as such, that shows its singularity. . . . These pure singularities communicate only in the empty space of the example, without being tied to any common property, by any identity.* [Agamben iii]

The *parergon* of the example, however, exemplifies further the relationship between frame and context, and puts further pressure on the concept of community. By distinguishing between ethical singularity (or the "idiomatic," singular, and untranslatable in Derrida's *Monolingualism of the Other* [56]) and political particularity (the translatable and paradigmatic for Derrida), the example's supplements demonstrate the ethical damage performed by the guest. The singular and the particular are parallel but not interchangeable terms. The singular stands in relation to the ideal; the particular in relation to the universal. Universal claims can often be challenged politically and conceptually with reference to particular instances and examples. The singular is a unique instance that cannot be explained solely in terms of a context or a framework and is irreducible to it. In that sense, it carries the trace of the ideal. (This is not to say that Idealism is free of universal claims, but it is to say that it does not have to be reduced to universalism. Of course, no instance of the singular in the world can be understood separately from its particular instantiation.) It is between these two analytical distinctions that responsible acts have to take place, and through which the nondialectizable antinomy functions.

An example that will help elaborate this idea of frames, borders, and hospitality is the photograph of Jacques Derrida with which this article began. In the photo, Derrida is about three years old, and is in a toy car on the rue Saint Augustin in Algiers.

*17. Luce Irigaray's "The Gesture in Psychoanalysis" is once again useful here, although I am bothered by the absolutism of sexual difference in this essay, preferring the more material understanding of women's difference apparent in her other works.*

The photo is provided as an example of auto-biography and auto-mobility [Derrida, *Of Hospitality* 141, 137]. The photograph appears in the book *Jacques Derrida,* by Geoff Bennington and Jacques Derrida, in which Bennington summarizes the central ideas of Derrida's work in pedagogical fashion in a "Derridabase" and Derrida writes the *parergonal* hypertext—the footnotes which are partly a commentary on Bennington's pedagogical exercise, partly a nostalgic reflection on an Algerian upbringing, a preemptive lament for his dying mother, and an analysis of Santa Monica (St. Augustine's mother) seen through the eyes of that North African saint. Saint Augustine becomes the point of departure for Derrida–the photo is taken on the rue Saint Augustin—in which, through circuitous routes, he returns to the theme of the burial of mothers in foreign lands. "Circumfession," as his section is called, tells the story of the slow and protracted death and burial of mothers. The circumfession (a Jewish North-African confession—a circumcised, or "cut" confession—which also departs from Saint Augustine's Confessions) is partly about what it means to belong. With Saint Augustine as his point of departure, he's clearly on the move. As we are told in the references beneath the photograph, the theme of the racing car comes up repeatedly in Derrida's writing. "The racing of a car is filmed or photographed, always on the verge of an accident, from one end of J.D.'s work to the other" [Bennington and Derrida 5].

The photograph's Augustinian roots foreshadow other routes potentially taken. The photo is also a cutting into the time of auto-biography, and auto-mobility. For Derrida, the car is rather like a photo that is "over-printed with the negative of a photograph already taken with a 'delay' mechanism" [Bennington and Derrida 39]. It captures the moment of motion, but holds it in a form of stasis. While this photo does not appear to have been overprinted in this way, it does involve a kind of doubling. It has a double framing, the large car in the frame at the back of the photo is overtaken by the secondary frame, introducing temporality into the image and nomadism. It no longer becomes possible simply to say, here is Derrida, age three or so, by the looks of it, sitting in a toy car in Algeria, the place of his origin. The double frame introduces a wound, and punctuation, into this photo, and the frame, or back window of the large car in the background, takes the story back even further to a questionable origin.[18] In "Circumfessions," a frame is given to us rather than a knowable context that would provide a foundational grasp of Derrida's *Algerian singularity* or an intact referent for the photograph. This isn't simply a rejection of a vulgar empiricism, but a wound opened that is about the burial of context. The seventh section of "Circumfessions" (written without periods denoting moments of completion of a concept) relates this repetitive doubling to the representability of life:

> *. . . I wonder if those reading me from up there see my tears, today, those of the child about whom people used to say "he cries for nothing,". . . compulsion to overtake each second . . . the memory of what survived me to be present*

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*18. The delay mechanism is a feature of photography, of course, in the sense that it is always to be observed after the fact even as it stages the event as a moment captured. Barthes discovers a childhood photograph of his dead mother:*

> . . . I had discovered this photograph by moving back through Time. . . . Starting from her latest image, taken the summer before her death (so tired, so noble. Sitting in front of the door of our house, surrounded by my friends), I arrived, traversing three quarters of a century, at the image of a child: I stare intensely at the Sovereign Good of childhood, of the mother, of the mother-as-child. Of course I was then losing her twice over, in her final fatigue and in her first photograph, for me the last; but it was also at this moment that everything turned around and I discovered her as *into herself.* *. . . [Barthes 71]*

*at my disappearance, interprets or runs the film again. . .* [Bennington and Derrida 39]

The moment of a life past, therefore inevitably lost forever, and, in Derrida's terms, buried, will always be cited out of context and placed within a frame. To build a picture of a past and an origin, as a prosthetist would, will always be an artificial exercise, however closely it approximates the life, because it will always rebuild a context to explain a singular life. Context appears to be a foundation, when it is actually a back-formation or a prefix, like an additional letter or syllable excluded from or appended to a word for emphasis, or like a prosthetic limb, replacing the function of something damaged.[19] This "cut" into autobiography and automobility is where the particular and the singular come together. What Derrida calls the *Prosthesis of Origin* in *The Monolingualism of the Other* is an exemplary moment of the coming together of the singular and the particular. It is not the reduction of a singular life to its particular contextual origin.

In an interview with *Le Nouvel Observateur,* Derrida speaks of how the trace of Algeria is present in everything he does, says, or writes. That is not to say that everything is reducible to his particular history in Algeria. We cannot rationalize everything he writes in terms of his Sephardic Algerian-Jewish background. We can certainly learn something from the fact that his family had fled the Spanish Inquisition, and that his grandfather became a French citizen in the 1870s with the signing of the Crémieux decrees. Crémieux, a French general, was Jewish, and granted Jews French citizenship. Very few Jews in Algeria had French citizenship prior to these decrees. Interestingly, Hélène Cixous, whose primary heritage through the matrilinear is German Jewish, discusses discovering the mixed roots of her father as Spanish, Berber, or Arab. But in 1867—that is, before the Crémieux decrees—her paternal family requested French citizenship along with another 144 Jews in Algeria.

> *I have a copy of this certificate by which a certain Jonas Cixous native of Gibraltar and interpreter for the French army was made and unmade "French," a certificate signed by Napoleon III. This is how some Jews had a despotic Emperor as godfather for their historic baptism. People on the left never forgave them for this upstage entrance. Gambetta whom I liked did not like us. . . .* [Cixous, "My Algeriance" 163]

We can also learn something from the fact that Jews in Algeria were stripped of their citizenship during WWII, thrown out of schools, unable to continue with their professions (some midwives, as Cixous tells us, remembering her mother's profession, were able to continue their reproductive labor.)[20] This disenfranchisement led to many Jews

*19. The back-formation and the prefix are of course very different grammatical entities. The back-formation describes a process through which a suffix is removed from the end of a word to make a new word. For example, the verb* to enthuse *is derived from the noun* enthusiasm, *but, partly because the back-formation is shorter, it appears incorrectly to be the original form or stem. Similarly, the term* pea *derives from* pease *(singular), and* peasen *(plural). As the* OED *explains, once* peasen *was reduced to* pease *(plural), the singular and the plural became identical. Because the pronunciation of* pease *was close to* peas, *the final sibilant, the* -s, *was eventually understood as the plural, thus resulting in the singular* pea. *The prefix is an addition at the beginning of the word, whereas the back-formation is the result of a subtraction of the suffix. On a more conceptual level, the back-formation can be seen as the basis of the concept of use-value, something both inside and outside the system of capital once value becomes the dominant logic [see Spivak, "Scattered Speculations on the Question of Value," and Spivak, "Ghostwriting"].*

*20. Cixous writes of the arbitrariness of borders quite extensively, and of how they afford and foreclose possibilities. Her grandmother, once a German war widow, became a French war*

having increased sympathy for the anticolonial movements in Algeria. But rather than draw on the historical mistrust and trust of Jews because of their complex background with citizenship, Derrida chooses to propose that the traces of Algeria remain in him; they do not, however, explain him. What is idiomatic in his language, and what remains as a singular form of responsibility toward Algeria, emerges not in a style,

> *but (in) an intersection of singularities, of manners of living, voices, writing, of what you carry with you, what you can never leave behind. What I write resembles, by my account, a dotted outline—"the* old-new language*" the most archaic and the newest, unheard of and thereby presently unreadable.* [Derrida, "Interview with Derrida" 111]

Extending the example of Derrida's photograph and deconstruction's Algerian origins poses the question of what is afforded by the notion of a prosthesis of origin? Does the language of prosthetics elucidate the function of knowing and problematizing foundationalist "origins," and does it help to understand the "frame" and giving hospitality to whomsoever arrives at one's gate? Does it demonstrate what framing and borders have to do with coloniality, and how to understand the "foreigner" as a trace of coloniality? How do a face (through *prosopopeia*), a signature (through *hypographiern*), and a *proper name* (here through the words *foreigner* and the proper name *Jacques Derrida*) emerge in writing in a manner that inscribes singularity? Derrida claims a signature that emerges as a counterpart to a context, or a prosthesis of origin in his work. And it is this signature of the singular and untranslatable that stands with and against community. Derrida's acknowledgment of the material force of an Algerian Jewish community is presented as a result of being marked by the complex history of Jewish citizenship, but Derrida has no desire to claim community as authentically his, or as the paradigm through which autobiography is to be imagined. Similarly, he has no desire to posit a framed community as the possibility for the future, and in this way is quite distinct from Giorgio Agamben, with whom I began this section. Even though Agamben acknowledges that a future radical community would be one in which singularities communicate, and in which common property or identity would be irrelevant factors, he nonetheless proposes a community to come, as the source of revolutionary political change, after the day of Judgement, when naked life, albeit somewhat Christianized in Agamben's rendition, will be all that is left. For Derrida, however, the future and hope is marked not by community, which will always be deconstructible and exclusionary even it aspires to be otherwise, but rather by justice, and by the promise that is uttered as an appeal to come, gathering difference, as the simultaneous possibility and impossibility of all speech, unrealizable but crucial to the pursuit of justice [Derrida, *Monolingualism of the Other* 67–69; Derrida, "Force of Law"].

If an explanatory foundationalist claim for an origin from an identitarian community—a Jewish Algerian community—is inadequate, then why and how should deconstruction be linked to decolonization? Does the example bring together philosophical and historical discourse in a way that provides an instance of the singular? And does this *parergon* complicate the idea of these universal-particular oppositions?

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*widow when Alsace changed hands. And this allowed her to leave Nazi Germany to live in France. Her father's ancestors, once Algerians, became French, and then, along with other Jews in Algeria, lost citizenship [Cixous, "Albums and Legends" 188–89].*

*Parergon Three: Foreigner*

Derrida has often approached the subject of foreigners somewhat obliquely, sometimes returning once again to former examinations to draw out a neglected element that has haunted him, and that demands attention previously deemed unwarranted. In a parenthetical quotation from *Monolingualism of the Other,* Derrida looks back to *Glas,* in which the philosophical conundrum set up by Antigone and her brothers exemplifies how community is developed out of its dissolution and through antinomy. The brothers Polyneices and Eteocles die as singular and opposing entities, and the community is maintained through this death of community. The quotation looks forward to the work *Of Hospitality,* in which Oedipus's is the exemplary arrival of the foreigner at Colonus:

> *(One day it will be necessary to devote another colloquium to language, nationality, and cultural belonging, by death this time around, by sepulture, and to begin with the secret of Oedipus at Colonus: all the power that this "alien" holds over "aliens" in the innermost secret place of the secret of his last resting place, a secret that he guards, or confides to the guardianship of Theseus in exchange for the salvation of the city and generations to come, a secret that, nevertheless, he refuses to his daughters, while depriving them of even their tears, and a just "work of mourning.")* [Derrida, *Monolingualism of the Other* 13]

Derrida speaks here of the secret burial place of Oedipus, who held his host, Theseus, hostage to the secret of his burial place. In return, Theseus's kingdom will be peaceful. Antigone and her sister Ismene would be prevented from mourning their father, condemned, says Derrida, to mourn mourning, as that which is lost is totally inaccessible. From the mourning of Santa Monica to the preemptive mourning of his own mother, who will be buried in a foreign land (in France), we arrive at a secret burial for a foreigner buried in a foreign land. While *Oedipus at Colonus* is in many ways the ur-text of the mourning of foreigners, the play acts out a gender inversion of the deaths that otherwise preoccupy Derrida. Derrida and Saint Augustine mourn their mothers patrilinearly, tracing a history of deaths in foreign lands and the work of mourning; and Antigone fails to mourn her father. Hélène Cixous's "My Algeriance" is dedicated to her dead father, as she reads her Algerian origins, her paradoxical relationship to French citizenship, the trace of Algeria that remains with her, and its particular feminine instantiation. It is an instance of what Gayatri Spivak would call the epistemic violence of coloniality. The particularity of the father's Sephardic origins and her mother's Ashkenazi origins with a history of Northern military graves presents a climate of violence to Cixous in which peoples were "gathered together in hostility by hostility" [Cixous, "My Algeriance" 171]. And as if experiencing the cutting off of familial lines, she laments, "I see a sort of genealogy of graves. When I was little, it seemed to me that the grave of my father came out of that grave of the North. My father's grave is also a lost grave. It is in Algeria. No one ever goes there any more or will ever go" [Cixous, "Albums and Legends" 189].

While in *Glas* Derrida concentrates on Hegel's reading of *Antigone,* in *Of Hospitality* he turns to Sophocles. Interestingly, he turns to Sophocles's late play *Oedipus at Colonus* (*Antigone* is performed first in 441 BC; *Oedipus Tyrannus* in 430 BC; and *Oedipus Coloneus* in 406 BC). The status of the secret turns the play into something quite distinct from the tragic actions of the two earlier plays; it is a turn to the poetics of tragic thought.

The beginning of the play appears to foreground some debate as to the relative guilt and innocence of Oedipus. He arrives in a foreign land with his daughter Antigone, and first a citizen, and then the chorus provisionally, and with some apprehension, allow him to enter sacred land. At first it appears that if we are going to find a form of justice that is somewhat less than satisfactory, such as the one found in Aeschylus's *Eumenides,* in which the ghost of Clytemnestra remains ignored and the nonhumanoid Eumenides are paid off with a new wardrobe of fine clothes. But this is not what we are given. That ur-text of mourning follows the establishment of laws of the state. In *Oedipus at Colonus,* the laws established are more about the protection of the foreigner. Theseus does not entertain the question of Oedipus's culpability. He invites Oedipus to tell his story, as if inviting him to inhabit a language he can carry with him. (Similarly, in *Of Hospitality,* Derrida is invited to speak by Anne Dufourmantelle in a long invitation.) For Derrida, language appears as the vehicle of *automobility.* It is internal, not like the prosthetics of communicative mobility—the cell phone or the fax machine. But language, Derrida says, "only works from me" [*Of Hospitality* 91]. It makes sense only when it leaves you, even if you think you carry it with you as you travel. Oedipus imparts an obligation to Theseus to maintain the secret of his burial place. The host becomes obliged to his dead guest, and held hostage to the secret. Theseus explains his decision to welcome Oedipus in terms of his own birth in a foreign land. His move is not, however, identificatory. The guest is substitutable and demands an obligation, a taking in, and a form of sacrifice on the part of the host (the sacrificial victim, the mouth, the source of a protective frame). And in taking the host hostage, the guest is instrumental in creating laws of hospitality.

Derrida remarks on the gendering of such laws, calling feminine sacrifice an instance of mourning mourning. For example, Antigone's status as the daughter of the foreigner takes away her own agency as foreigner with knowable origins and burial mounds. And Lot's protection of his guests from the Sodomites makes *hostiae,* or sacrificial victims, of his daughters. (We could add that women's lack of access to physical mobility in most cultural contexts makes travel more difficult and more limited, that women achieve the status of foreigner or citizen through relation to males, complicating further the word or name *foreigner,* placing it at one remove). Similarly, Antigone's feminine sacrifice leads to a distancing and removal—an instance of mourning mourning.

Mourning mourning, however, rather than mourning something known to be lost, seems more like a form of melancholia—an emotion at one remove having lost the ability to know what is lost. Derrida has written extensively of the distinction between mourning and melancholia, and that between introjection and incorporation. Taking his lead from Nicholas Abraham and Maria Torok, he writes of how introjection is the full assimilation of a lost object into oneself, and that incorporation is like swallowing whole a lost and inassimilable object. The incorporated object results in something similar to Freud's melancholia, an auto-criticism that is actually a criticism of that which is unidentifiable in the body of the melancholic. It manifests itself in phantasms encrypted in language, or in *demetaphorization*—the taking literally of something which makes sense only figuratively. Even though he finds the analytical distinctions useful, Derrida has rejected the distinction between mourning and melancholia, and introjection and incorporation, in favor of a concept of *mid-mourning*. The only way to mourn ethically is to mourn unsuccessfully, because full introjection would assume the possibility of assimilation of the other. The other's otherness would thus be lost. For Derrida, such an assimilation is not possible, because of the radical alterity of the other, and the responsibility toward that alterity.

But something is lost in the elision of the distinction. The mourner, after all, has some sense of what has been lost, even if there is an inassimilable, radically other, un-

knowable part which remains inaccessible. The melancholic does not.[21] The daughter of the foreigner, Antigone, is more of a melancholic. She does not know what secret Theseus holds, and is condemned to carry the phantom of that secret within her language. Antigone's complicated filiations and affiliations are singular. And yet, she is like all women who function within a patrilinear society. Filiation is mutable, and a relationship to the representative teleologies of group or state affiliation is tenuous.

Judith Butler, in an extensive reading of *Antigone* through Hegel and Lacan, has suggested that Antigone's melancholia is dramatized in the catachrestical language of antistate and antikinship protest. Its source lies in the establishment of kinship patterns that exclude a form of the feminine seen in Antigone.[22] In her overt mourning of Polyneices and Eteocles, she hardly knows what she mourns. Her melancholia originates in the failure to mourn the father before the brothers, or, indeed, buried even further, the failure to mourn her incestuous mother/grandmother.

While this reading is compelling, partly because it presents the melancholic protest of the foreign daughter as a source of something like what Gayatri Spivak (taking Greek tragedy and comedy, as well as Paul de Man as her source) would call "a permanent parabasis" [Spivak, *Critique of Postcolonial Reason* 430]—the breaking out of a frame for direct (and nonrepresentative) political commentary—there is a problem in both Derrida's and Butler's use of the example (and, indeed, Hegel's, Lacan's, Steiner's, Loraux's, Irigaray's, and Patocka's, among others).

Butler is right to draw on melancholia, and one could claim another foreigner, Derrida, as a melancholic who similarly disidentifies with the laws of kinship and the laws of the state. But to defer back (from the brothers, to the father, to the mother Jocasta) still maintains a framework in which the prosthesis of origin is a human in a Greek tragedy. The conceptual mistake is not just that there can be no more canonical exemplary document of the birth of kinship, community, statehood, and justice. Rather, the question arises as to why this prosthesis of origin rather than any other? (Why not take one's example from non-Western, nonhuman, *foreign* canons of origin?) The example, the "cut," the "frame," or the moment of exemplarity is, after all, singular *and* particular. It is not a particular that stands in for a universal. The example does not demonstrate radical nonidentification and nonhumanism with this foreigner's daughter (who is, after all, the daughter of an exiled king). When Butler writes that Antigone is nonhuman because she is outside the realm of kinship, her dehumanization and her repression are effectively confused with her status as a human. (Dehumanization is not the same as being nonhuman.)[23]

If hospitality is the welcoming of (and the possibility of being held hostage to) another's language, with all its secrets, phantoms, specters, and prehistories, then it should allow for the welcoming and incorporation of other prostheses of origin, and phantoms and specters of death, even though they may hold one hostage. For example,

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*21. While I ultimately disagree with Slavoj Žižek's structuralist Lacanianism and his reduction of all loss to structural lack, his essay "Melancholy and the Act" is useful in clarifying the melancholic's inability to know what has been lost [Žižek 657].*

*22. Butler departs from Irigaray's reading of Antigone as exemplary of feminist antistatism [Irigaray,* Speculum of the Other Woman *70]. Butler poses the important question, "[C]an Antigone herself be made representative for a certain kind of feminist politics, if Antigone's own representative function is itself in crisis? . . . [A]s a figure for politics, she points somewhere else, not to politics as a question of representation but to that political possibility that emerges when the limits to representation and representability are exposed" [Butler 2]. I am sympathetic to Butler's intervention here, and yet I wonder why the example of Antigone persists in returning when the issue of exemplarity is being problematized.*

*23. The nonhuman, monstrous, and prehuman of course played a part in the ancient Greek imaginary in the forms of, for example, centaurs, cyclops, and amazons. Kirsti Simonsuuri, in*

noncatachrestic, nonhuman(oid) prostheses, whether literal (as in the wonderful work done by Lisa Cartwright and Brian Goldfarb on the issue of prosthetic limbs that are more practical than human copies, but less acceptable because they appear nonhuman); or metaphorical, as in the pterodactyl that haunts Mahasweta Devi's story of that title, would introduce into the frame a different notion of the human and nonhuman than the examples of dehumanized figures. It is only by considering such nonhuman strangers that the possibility of nonidentificatory and nonempathetic community emerges. The politics of the frame (understanding hospitality through the arrival of the foreign melancholic Derrida or Antigone–the foreign-daughter-melancholic, rather than the "foreigner's daughter" Derrida speaks of) speaks only to the antinomy of some laws with *The* law of hospitality. As Gayatri Spivak has argued, in a reading of Mahasweta Devi's "Pterodactyl," a story about funeral rites, the lie of community, and the radical corporeality of the specter, the manner in which frames and examples rely on the prostheses of certain examples will always leave some outside of a frame (unprotected, anomalous, foreign, subaltern) [Spivak, *Critique of Postcolonial Reason* 142–48]. To acknowledge this is to foreground the ethico-political constraints of any framing, the opening of justice, and the establishment of communities even where the gesture of unworking is being made.

Robert J. C. Young's recent essay, "Deconstruction and the Postcolonial," is a defense of postcolonial theory's use of deconstruction against those who claim that theories so deeply embedded in Western philosophical discourse should be at best suspect analyses of non-western contexts. Young's essay elegantly begins with a reflection on sending Derrida his book *White Mythologies* (whose title he takes from Derrida's essay on metaphor) and ends (with a consideration of Derrida's writing on Algeria) in a second-person address to Derrida as if in postcards framing a more conventionally argued section. He suggests that "Derrida, a colonized subject bearing the effects and affects of the complex recent history of French colonial Algeria, was immediately placed in a marginal position to the still imperial social and cultural politics of metropolitan France." Reading Derrida's critique of metropolitan structuralist (and particularly Lévi-Straussian) anthropology in the terms of marginalized origins, Young concludes that there is a sort of "cultural and intellectual decolonization" that demonstrates both the differential logics of non-Western societies elided by structuralism, and the conversion of Western mythologies into universalisms [Young 198–99].

Mustapha Marrouchi has posed the question of how "to make visible the historical bases of intellectual signatures." He suggests that "all post-structuralist rejections of origin myths are, in fact, alibis for a-historical and a-political posturing . . ." [Marrouchi 5]. Marrouchi does not want the reader to reject the idea that there is too much humanist fantasizing in the search for origins, which are at best messy. But in the interests of "geo-politically aware protocols of vigilance," he wants to understand what connects Derrida and Algeria, and how the connection between the two "calls the relationship from its absolute singularity" [Marrouchi 5, 6]. In other words, he wants to understand how the singular, in any given instance or in any example, will also relate out of its singularity to a context, and in fact, manifest itself in a kind of a trace or a remainder. Marrouchi criticizes Derrida for evading responsibility toward Algeria, for his encryption of Algerian signatures. Derrida speaks out on apartheid as the exemplary form of racism, Marrouchi writes, but he remains relatively quiet about Algeria's traumatic relationship with France, and indeed, about the particular forms of trauma undergone by Jewish Algerians who were stripped by the French of French citizenship during WWII

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*a keynote address to the Nordic Summer University in August 2001, discussed these mythical figures as liminal, creating alternative boundaries, often violating hospitality, and representing frightening otherness.*

(without being prompted to do so by the Nazis behind the Vichy regime). Since Marrouchi's article appeared, and in fact just preceding its appearance, Derrida has indeed been more directly vocal about his Algerian background, the problems that have been afflicting the country for the last ten to fifteen years, the racist immigration laws which have been put in place by Pasqua in France, and the exploitative status of the "sans papiers" workers in France. But Marrouchi's initial question nonetheless remains—what does it mean to consider Derrida's relationship to Algeria given that origin is a prosthesis, and a substitute for that which is lost? What is the relationship between the singular as opposed to the particular (context) or the communal (another form of foundational thought)? And what are the political implications of understanding origin as a hopelessly reductive presentation of a particularity?

Marrouchi argues that poststructuralist critiques of origins are apolitical alibis, which could lead to outright hostility. One could also argue that the political disempowerment of colonized peoples in Algeria or Jewish-Algerian franco-maghrebians "like" Derrida leads to the development of a secondary form of analysis that acts out a politics without engaging with it directly. But Derrida gives us a way of understanding what is problematic about such gestures in his claim to exemplarity and singularity made in *The Monolingualism of the Other; or, The Prosthesis of Origin*. Taking the "case" of Derrida and Algeria as an example to elaborate an idea about frames, borders, and foreigners allows for an examination of how autobiography and automobility have been central to community, framing, and context. The example, as we know from the earlier citation by Giorgio Agamben, is singular, even though it acts like a particular case history that can exemplify a more general and perhaps universal argument.

> *If I have indeed revealed the sentiment of being the only Franco-Maghrebian here or there, that does not authorize me to speak in the name of anyone, especially not about some Franco-Maghrebian entity whose identity remains in question. . . . To be a Franco-Maghrebian, one "like myself," is not, not particularly, and particularly not, a surfeit or richness of identities, attributes, or names. In the first place, it would rather betray a* disorder of identity. [Derrida, *Monolingualism of the Other* 14]

On the one hand, Derrida explains this disorder in terms of "community"—one that has suffered the ablation, or removal, of citizenship. He describes a "community" that goes against any notion of coming together through commonality. It is "disintegrated" and exists only retrospectively through the experience of disintegration [Derrida, *Monolingualism of the Other* 55].[24] Derrida describes the lack of identification in a community that relies on the memory of something that did not take place. This relational configuration constitutes the essence of nostalgia, and in the cut we have taken here, of what Derrida would call his *nostalgérie*. The nostalgic photograph of the young boy Derrida is thus framed through the rue Saint Augustin as if the context we are given foreshadowed a circumfession, mobility, and the necessity of arriving elsewhere from an irretrievable route.

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*24. The work of Jean-Luc Nancy comes to mind here. The inoperative community is a community of unworking and undoing. It does not, for example, come together through identification other than to disidentify immediately. Nor does the community come together through community archive, or what Vamik Volkan would call a "chosen trauma" [see Volkan]. For such formations carry the supplements of their own undoing within them. The community may exist momentarily in an event, but will fall apart as soon as there is an attempt to narrativize that event [see Nancy].*

*. . . [T]o translate the memory of what, precisely, did not take place, of what, having been (the) forbidden, ought, nevertheless, to have left a trace, a specter, the phantomatic body, the phantom member–palpable, painful, but hardly legible–of traces, marks, and scars. As if it were a matter of producing truth of what never took place by avowing it. . . . Invented for the genealogy of what did not happen and whose event will have been absent. . . .* [Derrida, *Monolingualism of the Other* 61]

There is no past that is accessible through which to identify, other than a reconstructed past presented as true rather than prosthetic. For Derrida, given the lack of a knowable past, there lies only a form of futurity within which that past may inscribe itself: "As if there were only arrivals [*arrivés*], and therefore only events without arrival. From these sole 'arrivals,' and from these arrivals alone, desire springs forth . . ." [Derrida, *Monolingualism of the Other* 61]. These arrivals in French suggest both occurrences—events—and the arrival of people. These examples of arrivals, which make up a new language of singularities, carry a trace, a mark, or a scar. The trace is present in Cixous's theorization as well:

*To depart (so as) not to arrive from Algeria is also, incalculably, a way of not having broken with Algeria. I have always rejoiced at having been spared all "arrival." I wanted* arrivance, *movement, unfinishing in my life. It is also out of departing that I write. I like the phrase* j'arrive *(I'm coming, I manage, I arrive. . . ), its interminable and subtle and triumphant messianicity. The word* messiance *comes to me from Algeria.* [Cixous, "My Algeriance" 170]

Unlike Agamben, who sees the singularities coming together as a nonidentificatory community-to-come, "these pure singularities communicate only in the empty space of the example, without being tied to any common property, by any identity" [Agamben iii], for Derrida, the arrivals carry a secret and melancholic something with them. For Cixous, they carry an affective messianicity. The singular, apparent in exemplarity, does not stand in relation to the revolutionary Ideal (in a similar relation of the particular to the universal) for Derrida as it seems to for Agamben. Those who and that which arrive exemplify the antinomy between the laws of history and the law of singularity. And the arrival-as-guest, whether the young Derrida arriving in France from Algeria, or something else with which we cannot identify, exemplifies the antinomy between *The* law of hospitality and the laws of hospitality. The example of the foreigner reveals how the example cannot stand for the general. The example of *foreigner* will always be the counterexample who—or which—breaks the law of exemplarity, and who also demonstrates the imagining of damage to the frame.

*Parergon Four: Woman*

*(This civil war is for the most part a war of men. In many ways not limited to Algeria, this* civil *war is also a* virile *war. It is thus also, laterally, in an unspoken repression, a mute war against women. It excludes women from the political field. I believe that today, not solely in Algeria, but there more sharply, more urgently than ever, reason and life, political reason, the life of reason and the reason to live are best carried by women; they are within the reach of Algerian women: in the houses and in the streets, in the workplaces and in all institutions.)* [Derrida, "Taking a Stand for Algeria" 22]



One hardly needs Jacques Derrida to make such an insight about women in Algeria, or, indeed, in almost any war zone. His emphasis, however, on the life of political reason poses the question of what that might be in the context of consistent political exclusion. The virility of war, after all, extends to the virility of the "community" in whose name the war is fought. Practically speaking, that community includes women (hence the designation *Algerian women,* and also the assumption that the noun or proper name *Algerians* includes the women of that nation-state). However, the virile community often speaks in the name of women but fails to represent women's interests. A *critical melancholia* emerges from these representations of women, and it is in the attempt to listen to this melancholia that a critical politics can be perceived. It emerges from marginalization, repression, and exclusion from community. Such a situation cannot simply be resolved through liberalism: inclusion, representation, centralization, or released repression. If one exists at the margins of community, it is as a frame that causes damage to the interior. If community is revealed as virile, then it is damaged by the supplement of woman, and other forms of political coming together need to be examined. The identitarian logic of community, whether anticolonial, anticapitalist, or feminist, does not allow for the "cut" in autobiography or the genealogy of community. While a prosthesis for this melancholia can be identified, it is a self-critical one that emerges from the failure of community. It also reveals, however, the necessity for a nonsolipsistic form of political protest without identification among protestors; a *just* work of melancholia, a *messiance* of sorts, but not one that can simply propose itself as the solution for a future. It must be an undoing and unworking, rather than a utopian leap of faith.

How do we move from the philosophical category of woman and the feminine to "women"? Or indeed from the supplement of "foreigner" to foreigners? It is here that the category of the subaltern is most useful in understanding the social implications of philosophical speculation on the *parergon*. Lifting the category of liminality—the feminine—into the political and critical arena of women should not, however, make them synonymous. Not all women occupy liminal positions, and the feminine is not exclusively or inevitably characterized in women. And clearly not all women are subalterns, even if it is the condition of femininity that marks them as subalterns. The subaltern is a category discussed by Antonio Gramsci in *The Prison Notebooks* to describe a class of people who are not members of civil society, and therefore have no representation within it or protection by the political society which governs it. This class of people does not, however, exactly constitute a class because they have no coherent or recognizable class consciousness. They are not unified politically, and they are not visible to political or civil society. When they are recognizable, they have probably ceased to exist *as subalterns* and have begun to emerge in civil society, perhaps in the form of an organic intellectual who works to constitute a counterhegemony. They manifest themselves, however, in moments of spontaneous insurgency. They are disruptive to political society precisely because they cannot be identified as a specific group with coherent demands. They cannot, therefore, simply give their consent to the hegemonic structure. If civil society is maintained by political society through consent to domination, it is through the work of traditional intellectuals. However, if the subaltern group cannot be identified, they exist as a remainder to this group, a supplement or parergon to the force field maintained in the frame: civil society. If the feminine subaltern has been inassimilable to civil society, it is largely through the apparently invisible modes of feminine production internationally.

In *Beyond the Frame,* Deborah Cherry discusses the idea of framing through that of pictorialization. Drawing from Derrida's *Truth in Painting,* and from Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's concept of worlding, she discusses British militant feminists' travels to

Algeria in the nineteenth century and their role in *textualizing* Algeria. For Cherry, the concept of worlding refers to a process through which colonies—presented as blank territories—were inscribed and pictorialized through an imperial lens. Analyzing the writings and paintings of Barbara Leigh Smith (Bodichon), she explains how Smith's largely orientalist (though perhaps proto-feminist) work functioned to introduce Algeria into the discourse of European landscape art by showing how it had been beyond the frame of reference. Derrida contends that the frame is a field of force, violently imposed and restricting. Cherry understands this as an instance of *worlding*—colonial epistemic violence. She argues that the land was enclosed through the techniques of (imperial) European landscape art, and that the violence and trauma of the act was denied within the process.

The process is double-edged, of course. If the *parergon* of the frame is both protector and the condition of possibility for permeability, Cherry reminds us of Derrida's suggestion that a "gesture of framing, by introducing the bord, does violence to the inside of the system and twists its proper articulations out of shape . . ." [Derrida, *Truth in Painting* 69; Cherry 99]. Once Algeria is pictorialized by the frame of landscape painting, damage is done to that frame, and its permeability and supplementarity are made apparent. Its function as a force field has been interrupted. In the case of Barbara Leigh Smith, doing feminist work and putting women onto the agenda allows viewers paradoxically to see interruptions to the force field created in the process of pictorializing Algeria. Smith's painting itself interrupts the frame of European colonialist presence in Algeria through her femininity and creates a new force field through the pictorialization of the landscape. And so while there has been damage done to a largely masculinist world of painting, another force field has been established, with another potential guest waiting at the gate.

To some extent this article has suggested that there are nonsubstitutable and nonequivalent supplements of all forms based in a variety of contexts. But at the same time it is worth being alert to what Saïd Chikhi has called a field of marginality that seems distinctly Algerian. Not all forms of marginality are equivalent, nor is degree the most important consideration in understanding marginality. The Sephardic-Jewish Algerian Derrida theorizes marginality, and the Ashkenazi Algerian Cixous theorizes her *algeriance* as a trace that draws her to Algerian women in France.[25] For Algerian Jews, the ablation of citizenship during WWII underlined the tenuousness of their 130 years of French belonging. For other Algerians, the very complicated laws around citizenship, rights, and assimilation were responsible for the peculiar mixture of hegemony and domination. Azzedine Haddour, in his book *Colonial Myths: History and Narrative,* has described this paradoxical relation very persuasively, in terms of the cooptation of the *évolués,* and the expropriation of the masses. He sees a melancholia in colonial and postcolonial Algeria emerging from the policies of assimilation and the actuality of expropriation [175–92].

The inassimilable other, or the remainder of assimilation, manifests itself as melancholia and is the site of the subaltern. Unable to achieve representation in the language of the state, it nonetheless interrupts through insurgency, through representational breakdown, through a critical agency always in search of justice.

This critical agency is melancholia, concerning the loss of an Ideal of the right of subjecthood that the French in Algeria ostensibly endorsed. Melancholia manifests it-

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25. The paradox of this passport: having it always closed me in a double-bind.

On the one hand "I am French" is a lie or a legal fiction.

On the other to say "I am not French" is a breach of courtesy. And of the gratitude due for hospitality. The stormy, intermittent hospitality of the State and the Nation. But the infinite hospitality of the language. *[Cixous, "My Algeriance" 154]*

self in subaltern interruptions, as guests at the doors of nation-states that cause damage to the exclusionary force field within. It is through Derridean concepts of hospitality and through psychoanalytic notions of melancholia that we see how foreign women potentially damage those force fields. The damage leaves an open wound that the force field itself would try to heal as a narcissistic scar. The remainder of something "other," infantile sexual pleasure, can manifest itself only as a "narcissistic scar," says Freud, because there is no room for it to be pleasure in the adult, assimilated as she is to "civilization." The "open wound" is a term used by Freud for melancholia. It cannot be healed through the curative hospitality of the hospital. The difference of the lost other would be betrayed in such a process, leaving at best a narcissistic wound. For the melancholic, the lost other remains an ambivalent presence, damaged and damaging [Freud, "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" 291; "Mourning and Melancholia" 262].

Clearly, "woman" and "foreigner" are not the same in terms of particularity or of singularity, as the example of the foreigner's daughter shows. The foreign daughter is not simply doubly supplemented, and it is insufficient to "add on" gender as a category of analysis to that of "foreign." The logic of the supplement itself disallows such additive progression. Additive progression and prioritization have historically not allowed for an engagement with the supplement, or hospitality to the potential damage it causes to the frame. A supplement to a supplement, is by definition marginalized by the force field of the first. This suggests a prioritization of the center, rather than attention to the undoing of the center performed by the supplement. If we think of a movement toward national independence that, for example, excludes the rights of an ethnic sector, or considers feminism—or even something as basic as women's rights—as a lower priority, then clearly sustaining a new hegemony has become more important than the undoing of injustice. Out of what seemed like political necessity, the ethical exclusion of Berbers and feminist issues from Algerian national politics has been a case in point. The idea of substitution is important here. The supplement is not interchangeable. When Derrida speaks of the substitutability of the guest, it is not in the sense of the interchangeable. The French words *supplément* and *suppléer* are somewhat untranslatable. As Ellen Armour has noted, the *supplément* means not only something added on, but also something that exceeds. And *suppléer* suggests supplanting or replacing/substituting, as well as supplementing. There will always be a supplement. And it will always supplant that which has been included into the force field of the frame. One supplement will substitute for another only in the sense that each, in its singularity, will do damage to the frame, and having done damage, will inevitably be subsequently damaged itself by another supplement [Armour 198–200]. Derrida says this not to create the nihilistic endlessly deferrable. Rather, he asks us to do the work of not accepting closure, not simply including the marginalized, and not recentralizing. Such gestures do not take into account the betrayal of difference made in such a gesture, and do not allow for the damage done to an unjust frame.

The field of marginality that exists within Algeria is constituted by the force field of the state. The forms of marginality that emerged revealed the problems of that force field, even as it changed to adjust to different global economic demands. Whereas the concepts of counterhegemony and hegemony emphasize alternative modes of new power structures, that of hospitality returns one to the openness to damage caused by the arrival of the supplement, and on undoing rather than building an alternative of recentralized force fields. Less about building hegemony or community, it listens for fractures so as to understand how a force of criticism functions in the supplement politically and ethically. The notion of international responsibility for the pursuit of justice motivates this listening, rather than the call for rights or for inclusion in a community of those who have been marginalized by it. It involves learning the lesson of damage to the force field that it has constituted.

A video installation by Zineb Sedira, a French-Algerian conceptual artist living in London, captures this lesson. The installation's title is a pedagogical imperative: "Don't do to her what you did to me!" The video works from the idea of the talisman—something written on a piece of paper by an Imam that should be kept on the body of the person to whom it is given as a form of protection and well-wishing. Some people swallow the talisman to keep it within them. In Sedira's video, a woman's hands are shown writing on passport photographs of a woman repeatedly "Don't do to her what you did to me!" [fig. 2]. The command is clearly also an accusation for alleged damage done to the "me," and a sense of protection toward the "her." And it involves a third person to whom the imperative is addressed. The hands are then shown tearing the paper into small pieces and placing them into a glass of water [fig. 3]. As the paper is placed in the water, the ink runs, and for a moment we are presented with a screen of black tails swirling together as if in reference to Arabic script [fig. 4]. This is the most aesthetic and aestheticized section of the video, as if to draw on the familiar association of script and to inscribe the talismanic reference. The sound of the film is minimal and yet striking. We hear the tearing of the photographs, and then the sound of a metal spoon stirring against glass. The torn photographs are being mixed, as if they could fully dissolve like an effervescent medicine or a digestive. The camera closes in on the words swirling around in the glass. We see now that the talisman has been written in English and in French. While the sound of the stirring is insistent, and while the scraps of photographs are mixed rapidly, they do not appear to dissolve. The stirring ceases, the hand stops. The spoon is removed. And the glass is picked up. We assume that its contents are drunk (although given the quantity of paper in the glass, some effort would be involved in the swallowing) as an empty glass is then placed on the table. The ritual has taken nine minutes of real time. Although there are at least three figures involved in the plot (the addressee, the "me" and the "her"), we have witnessed one person only: the writer, the mixer, and now the drinker are the same person. As we do not see the face of the person, we cannot know whether the passport photographs are hers or another's. And the insistence of the feminine gesture—the simple sound, the repetitive writing, the real time rendition—causes a variety of conjectures. What did the person do to receive such a reprimand? Do the hands we see in the film belong to the addressee? Or is it the "me" writing and drinking out of despair as if overdosing on the lesson to be taught? Or is this the "her," attempting to swallow a difficult and inassimilable lesson of betrayal so as to warn against all damage done to "hers"? Is this a lesson that could be digested, or has it been swallowed whole? Whoever the hands belong to, they communicate that repetition of the same, or working within the same convention, has brought despair. The lesson attempts to do damage to the framework of convention, so that what was done to "me" would not continue to be done to "her." And the visual, linguistic, and aesthetic appeal is made in at least three languages, those of the three figures involved, of English, French and the Islamic talismanic ritual that is damaged and performed in the feminine.

Other works by Sedira depict an encrypted feminine that does damage to both Islamic art forms and Western stereotypical conceptions of these. What appears to be an almost overly conventional geometrically patterned panel of tile work in *Quatre générations de femmes* is more complex when seen up close [fig. 5]. The geometric patterns conventionally held within them extremely complex mathematical and cosmological arrangements, and were built on an intricate philosophical system. It was conventionally a purely masculine art form, and often included Arabic calligraphy. Sedira breaks through these conventions by producing them herself, by depicting computer-generated images of her grandmother, her mother, her daughter and her own eyes, thus defying the Islamic prohibition against figurative images [fig. 6]. The complex

geometrical designs include writing in French, telling a story of geographical rather than cosmological immigration—one generation's to France, and her own to Britain. Sedira's point is not simply to identify herself as a London beurette, but to work into the material of convention an encrypted story of reproductive labor—the hidden work of women behind the art form. Playing with this idea of the hidden and the figurative, she photographs herself in a series "Don't do to her what you did to me II!" putting on a headscarf [fig. 7]. The photographs depict various stages of the ritual. But rather than the plain white or black hijab common in Algeria, Sedira's headscarf is covered in passport images of a woman. They speak of the complexity of border crossings and invisibility, working with the idea of a visual pun that causes damage to the force field of what are understood to be conventional visual practices through pictorialization. There is an ironic iconoclastic twist here, as the veil—a barrier to seeing women's faces in the Islamic context, and a Western stereotype of Islam's oppression of women—becomes imprinted with the visual marker of singularity: the face. These lessons of damage are not simply assimilable into the fields that generated them: they do damage to those force fields. Read in terms of the various frameworks that inform dominant paradigms of discipline formation, as well as the cultural, political, and historical frames that sustain a work, that damage can be perceived and the call for the undoing of injustice can be heard.

At the Baku conference in 1917, Bolshevik women called for women to unite internationally against the forces of capitalism, and there was an outcry to stop dealing with middle-class issues and solutions (like the vote and the chador—shocking how the debate has changed so little in eighty years) until women's rights under communism are deemed as worthy as men's. The demands made at the conference were never as strong in any of the subsequent communist internationals—the worldwide workers' movements to overthrow capitalism. While the call forced an acknowledgement that women's concerns under capitalism were specific, that women's oppression dominated all forms of oppression internationally, and that it should not be considered as separate and of lower priority, the oppression of working men nonetheless received priority. The issue of the chador, we see now, is hardly frivolous, even if it once seemed to be a middle-class obsession. But the women's international has never been as strong as it was at that moment, because the particular plight of women in capitalism was always considered of secondary importance to the primary struggle—as if it could be dismissed as merely culturalist. (Clearly, the economic and cultural are not separate or even separable entities.) Each of the marxist internationals have had major blind spots and prioritizations, and reading for the supplement, we can recognize the profound injustice done within these internationalist gestures. The first International Working Men's Association of 1864 concentrated on European colonies. While it was clearly a response to European colonialism, the colonies outside of Europe were largely neglected. The Second International of 1889 was concerned with Russian and Austrian imperial relations. The Comintern, or Third International, would finally recognize the need for home rule among colonies as a part of the anticapitalist struggle.[26] The question of feminist interventions in the resistance was, however, largely ignored, as it was later in the majority of independence struggles from the 1940s to the 1960s. Even today, analyses of international forms of resistance to global capitalism often fail to recognize how women's labor—whether reproductive or productive—is consistently

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*26. I am indebted to Robert J. C. Young's* Postcolonialism *[115–40] for this identification of the exclusions of various internationals. His book is an important intervention into Marxist postcolonial studies attempting to trace a more leftist genealogy betrayed by so many contemporary postcolonial regimes.*

***Figure 2.*** *"Don't do to her what you did to me!" Still from video installation. Video projection duration: 8 minutes (1998/2001). Funded by Arts Council of England and Africa in Venice. Courtesy of Zineb Sedira.*

***Figure 3.*** *"Don't do to her what you did to me!" Still from video installation. Video projection duration: 8 minutes (1998/2001). Funded by Arts Council of England and Africa in Venice. Courtesy of Zineb Sedira.*

***Figure 4.*** *"Don't do to her what you did to me!" Still from video installation. Video projection duration: 8 minutes (1998/2001). Funded by Arts Council of England and Africa in Venice. Courtesy of Zineb Sedira.*

***Figure 5.*** *"Quatre générations de femmes." Installation. Computer-generated designs silk-screened onto ceramic tiles/interior installation (1997). Commissioned by the Gallery of Modern Art, Glasgow Museum Manchester. Courtesy of Zineb Sedira.*

***Figure 6.*** *"Quatre générations de femmes." Installation detail. Computer-generated designs silk-screened onto ceramic tiles/interior installation (1997). Commissioned by the Gallery of Modern Art, Glasgow Museum Manchester. Courtesy of Zineb Sedira.*



***Figure 7.*** *"Don't do to her what you did to me. II." Set of seven photographs. Dimension in cm: 1 of 60x45, 4 of 30x42, 2 of 21x30 (1996). Collection: Gallery of Modern Art, Glasgow Museum photograph. Courtesy of Zineb Sedira.*

sidelined in conceptualizations of resistant communities. Postcolonial feminist scholarship, particularly that with marxist sympathies, has written of the need for feminists to recognize women's "complex relationality" [Mohanty 13]. The main thrust of postcolonial feminist work has been consistently scrupulous about investigating the relations between women internationally, and locally based feminist movements have quite often been complicit with the manner in which global late capitalism has produced massive inequalities between women internationally.[27] Taking their lesson from the misguided and intrusive "paternalistic" work of early European feminism in their colonies, postcolonial feminists have been careful to remind themselves of how their own relative privilege is built upon the exploitation of other women in the current form of neoimperial late-capitalist organization. This has alerted women to the problems of global sisterhood, and the recognition that while ideals of international justice have been the motivating force of much feminist work, local long-term planning has always been necessary. The challenge intellectually and politically has been how to conceive of the local, and who or what appears as a foreigner (aggressor, invader, woman, nonexpert, expert, man, animal) at the gates of the local.

In order to conceive of a new form of political reason, supplements (and in my example, Algerian women) need to be listened to at the margins for what their presence or absence implies. This involves more than simply putting women center stage, or equating their voices with empowerment. It is a need to understand the nature of liminality that comes into view when one attempts to see force fields and frameworks from their positions, and what that means for the political reason that seeks justice outside the mechanisms of the virile wars that have characterized Algeria's modern history.

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